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Introduction 
The papers presented here are the result of a joint conference held by the Center 
for European Integration Study and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in 
December 2002 and thus part of a larger project of cooperation dealing with the 
future of Euro-Mediterranean relations.   
18 scholars from various countries around the Mediterranean rim meet to 
discuss the possible consequences of the September 11 attacks on Germany’s 
Mediterranean policy. 
As usually there was a wide range of opinions how Germany and its 
Mediterranean policy is affected by the WTC attacks and how the country 
should react. This arrow of opinions is partly documented in this discussion 
paper. 
The intention of the Center für European Integration Studies as well as the 
Konrad-Adenuer Foundation is to intensify the dialogue between academics 
from both sides of the Mediterranean shores in order to create some form of 
collective identity which – in the long run – may help to ease existing 
differences and misunderstandings. 
Both institutions are grateful to the Thyssen Foundation for their generous 
financial support of this joint effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               5 Christoph Zöpel  
September 11
th – Consequences for 
German Foreign Policy 
1. Introduction 
At this Third Meeting of the Mediterranean Forum of the Institute for 
European Integration Research, I should like to examine the following 
three aspects of the consequences of September 11
th for German foreign 
policy: 
-  the historical context in which the events of September 11
th occurred 
in relation to the global institutional framework within which interna-
tional politics has been conducted since September 11
th, 
-  the primary aim of our foreign policy, namely the external security of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and  
-  the asymmetric interdependencies between European and Arab States 
and the consequences of these for German foreign policy. 
I shall keep all three aspects in focus throughout this analysis.  
2. September 11
th: the event – the historical context – 
the global institutional framework 
The attacks of September 11
th, considered as a singular event, were a coor-
dinated act of terrorist violence with an unprecedented death toll of about 
3,000. September 11 – Consequences for German Foreign Policy 
The attack was organized by a globally active non-governmental terrorist 
organization, the al-Qaeda network. The network is a private organization. 
Indeed, if we consider its place in the dichotomy of state and society, it 
must be regarded as part of civil society. 
Al-Qaeda justifies the terrorist attack as a defence of Islamic values and a 
condemnation of the economic dominance and ‘culture’ of the ‘West’, in 
other words chiefly of the United States and Europe.  
The terrorist attack of September 11
th has proved to be a link in a chain of 
singular attacks by al-Qaeda, foremost among these being the attacks on 
the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi before September 11
th 
and on ‘Western’ tourists on the islands of Djerba and Bali as well as on 
Israeli tourists in Kenya after that date.  
Acts of terrorism are known to us from classical antiquity, one example 
being the notorious destruction of the Temple of Artemis in Ephesus by 
Herostratus as long ago as 356 B.C. The 19
th century also saw notorious 
acts of terrorism, notably those committed by the Russian anarchists. It is 
therefore necessary to examine the historical context, to identify the his-
torical roots of the terrorist attacks that culminated in September 11
th. 
The historical context in which they occurred is that of globalization. The 
technological and socio-cultural dimensions of the globalization process 
are the most significant in this respect, whereas its economic dimension 
assumed greater importance in the wake of the attacks. To see the eco-
nomic dimension as paramount is to misinterpret the globalization process. 
The technological dimension comprises 
-  the means of moving messages, money and people around the world at 
short and even extremely short notice, and 
-  the ubiquitous availability of the explosives and devices required for 
powerful explosions.  
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The social dimension comprises 
-  the contrast between the ubiquitous technological means with which 
high-impact acts of violence can be perpetrated and the concentration 
of the instruments of economic and military power in the hands of in-
dividual companies and states,  
-  the prosperity gap between North America/Western Europe and most 
of the other regions of the world which are home to the vast majority 
of the global population, and  
-  the cultural differences between ‘Western’ rationalism, with its per-
sonal and economic implications, and the Islamic religion.  
The defining feature of the global institutional framework in which terrorist 
attacks take place is the tension between the national approach and the su-
pranational approach. This is reflected in the phenomena of 
-  globalization, 
-  regionalization, 
-  superstates, and ‘failed states’. 
The United States and China on the one hand and countries such as 
Rwanda, Somalia and Afghanistan on the other are part of the UN system 
and the Bretton Woods system and have, in principle, submitted to suprana-
tional law. 
States are committed to regional and interregional military, economic and 
cultural organizations. The main organizations of relevance to the ‘West’ 
are NATO and the OECD, while the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence (OIC) and the Arab League are the relevant bodies as far as the Is-
lamic Arab nations are concerned. 
Relations between neighbouring regions have developed and have become 
more important than bilateral relations between countries in those regions. 
One of these structures is the contractual cooperation that takes place be-
tween the EU Member States and the non-European Mediterranean States. 
The European Union has developed as a community of nations which have 
assigned sovereign rights to the supranational organization. The United 
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States in particular, but China, India and Russia too, have no compelling 
need of regional integration, and so they consider their sovereign rights to 
be only minimally restricted by supranational law. Other countries, such as 
Somalia, Rwanda and the Congo, are caught up in a process of dissolution. 
Afghanistan is another of these countries, which is why it came to be used 
as the logistics base of al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda network was able to train a 
private terrorist army there, thanks to its cooperation with one of those 
governments exercising territorial control for which it did not possess an 
entirely legitimate mandate under international law, namely the Taliban. 
3. The impact on Germany of the al-Qaeda terrorist at-
tacks 
Germany is affected by the terrorist attacks: 
-  as the legal or illegal place of residence of al-Qaeda members, helpers 
or sympathizers,  
-  through the German victims of the terrorist attacks, particularly the 
attack on Djerba,  
-  as the second most populous country of the ‘West’, and 
-  as a country with a large Muslim minority, comprising 2.5 million in-
habitants, mostly of Turkish origin. 
In institutional terms, Germany can act in this matter: 
-  as a member of the UN, in which it is about to serve a two-year term 
on the Security Council, beginning in 2003, 
-  as a member of NATO and the OECD,  
-  as a member of the European Union, and 
-  as a participant in European cooperation with the region of the Middle 
East and Southern Mediterranean. 
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4. International political consequences 
The basis for the policy pursued in the wake of September 11
th by the 
United States, the direct victim of the attacks, as well as by the community 
of nations is UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001): 
The Resolution states that the Security Council regards the terrorist attacks 
of 11  September  2001 as a threat to international peace and security. It 
thereby declares a non-governmental act of violence with implications in 
the realm of international law to be a threat to world peace. This resolution 
of the Security Council evidently represents a momentous change in inter-
national law which needs to be subjected to expert analysis; its political 
consequences are unforeseeable.  
The resolution calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to jus-
tice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks. It 
begs the question whether bringing them to justice is a matter for the police 
or military forces. And the resolution also condemns those who are respon-
sible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and 
sponsors of these acts, which means that it relates to governments too. This 
is an appeal to the ability of the international community to take action to 
guarantee security, which may be interpreted as both external and internal 
security. It follows from the inclusion of external security that the resolu-
tion is also condemning those States that do not prosecute international ter-
rorists, not to mention those that support them. 
The resolution expresses the readiness of the Security Council to take all 
necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and 
to combat all forms of terrorism and calls on the international community 
to do likewise. The appeal to the international community to redouble its 
efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts repeats the message of previ-
ous resolutions, especially Resolution 1269 (1999). This expression of 
readiness to respond to the terrorist attacks paves the way for specific op-
erations against specific perpetrators, although the question whether these 
should be police or military operations is once more left unanswered. 
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Resolution 1368 was followed by the efforts of the United States to coop-
erate with the entire international community in combating terrorism in 
general as well as its specific manifestations. Among the prerequisites for 
such cooperation are efforts to restore the viability of failed states. 
This cooperation resulted in rapprochement between, on the one hand, the 
United States and the other members of NATO and, on the other hand, 
China, Russia, both India and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic 
States in the context of the fight against terrorism. 
Efforts to stabilize ‘failed states’ or restore their viability have been initi-
ated in Somalia, Yemen and, above all, in Afghanistan. Following the mili-
tary operations in Afghanistan against the perpetrators of the Septem-
ber 11
th attacks and against a territorial power that had supported them, a 
package of political and socio-economic measures was put in place for the 
creation of a viable state, the establishment of institutions and the devel-
opment of the Afghan economy. At the same time, the domestic purpose of 
deploying an international security force emerged clearly. Enduring Free-
dom was an unequivocally military operation designed to fight terrorism 
and topple the Taliban regime, while the creation of the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) was a measure designed to support the estab-
lishment of a viable Afghan State. Its function is that of a police force, 
which means that it serves to train police officers and administrative staff 
and to implement the necessary technical and financial measures in the 
framework of economic cooperation. This link is indicative of the transition 
between a common external-security policy of the international community 
and the global coordination of internal-security policies and domestic social 
development. It illustrates the way in which globalization is causing foreign 
policies and world domestic policies to merge. 
Resolution 1368 was followed by intensified global political cooperation, 
particularly with regard to the naming of terrorist organizations, global in-
tervention in their financial transactions and coordinated police investiga-
tions. 
Differing positions between the poles of supranational law and the claims 
of the American superpower are reflected in the domain of criminal pun-
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ishment. This applies specifically to the diverse views on the nature of the 
detention of captured Taliban and al-Qaeda members in the Guantanamo 
prison camp and in general terms to the recognition of the International 
Criminal Court. 
These differences of opinion, particularly between the United States and 
the Member States of the European Union, are identifiable as matters of 
foreign policy and can be addressed through diplomatic channels. They can 
also be interpreted, however, as differing positions on the future develop-
ment of world domestic policy, which, on the basis of the national under-
standing of home affairs, naturally focuses first and foremost on the need 
for an effective globally operative police and judicial system. This polarity 
is complicated by the fact that it is difficult in practice to draw a line be-
tween conventional conflicts involving both force and terror, whether they 
are civil wars or wars between nations. The most relevant example, apart 
from the civil war in Chechnya, which belongs to Russia under interna-
tional law, is the Middle East conflict between Israel and its direct and indi-
rect Arab neighbours. Since September 11
th the Israeli Government has in-
creasingly been presenting the Palestinian acts of violence as part of inter-
national terrorism, or at least as specific manifestations of terrorist activity. 
Those aspects of the fight against terrorism that fall within the definition of 
world domestic policy are thus being woven into conventional military 
conflicts. In this particular situation, however, military thinking renders the 
socio-economic and cultural dimensions of efforts to prevent terrorism and 
of a potential world domestic policy obsolete. Projects in the Palestinian 
Autonomous Areas supported in the framework of international economic 
cooperation have been destroyed again by military operations. A cultural 
or, to be more precise, value-based dialogue between Jewish Israelis and 
Muslim Arabs is rendered impossible by the use of military force. 
Through the dispute between the United States and Iraq, the international 
community’s battle with terrorism assumes a different dimension than in 
the case of non-governmental acts of terrorism which may or may not be 
aided and abetted by governments. Iraq is not cooperating with the interna-
tional community in combating terrorism and stands justifiably accused of 
preparing for the governmental use of force with nuclear, biological and 
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chemical weapons. This, however, would be a conventional war between 
nations, a fact underlined by the nature of the military operations planned 
by the United States should diplomatic efforts, i.e. foreign policy, prove 
unsuccessful. 
Because of their relations with the neighbouring region of the Middle East 
and Southern Mediterranean, the States of Europe are affected in a different 
and more immediate manner than the United States by both the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the conflict with Iraq. They have a more pronounced interest 
than the United States in preventing escalation and promoting the resolu-
tion of these conflicts, and their actions are more strongly influenced by 
these motives.  
5. German policy since September 11
th 
The primacy of external security is also a determinant of German foreign 
policy. After the start of the ‘Cold War’, the primacy of external security 
was the driving force behind the integration process within NATO. The 
efforts to guarantee the external security of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and to prevent any conventional and nuclear aggression by the Soviet 
Union were based primarily on the military capabilities of Germany’s ma-
jor ally, the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, the military 
threat to Germany has receded. One result of this change is that the impor-
tance of NATO is judged from a different perspective. Al-Qaeda terrorism 
endangers both external and internal security. It therefore influences both 
the foreign and domestic policies of Germany. In the field of foreign pol-
icy, the emphasis is shifting from bilateral relations and cooperation within 
the Alliance framework to global and multilateral operations. This change 
of emphasis will almost inevitably impair bilateral relations with the nation 
whose security is only partly dependent on supranational law, namely the 
United States. Germany’s security, however, continues to depend not only 
on the guarantees given by the NATO Alliance but also on the pursuit of a 
global policy of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Recognition of this con-
flict of instruments in German foreign and global policy is essential if that 
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policy is to be adequately analysed and if such an analysis is to serve as the 
basis for useful proposals. 
5.1 Germany as a State in the international community 
Germany unreservedly accepts UN Security Council Resolution 1368 and 
acts as a constructive member of the international community. This ap-
proach manifests itself as follows:  
German membership of NATO. In the wake of 11
th September, NATO, for 
the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
which states that an armed attack against one or more Allies in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all. Germany 
voted in favour of that decision. The invocation of Article 5 has not yet had 
any consequences. The United States evidently considers the military struc-
tures of NATO to be unsuitable for what it regards as appropriate anti-
terrorist measures. The U.S. proposal that a NATO response force be estab-
lished, which was adopted at the Prague summit, represents an initial at-
tempt to address the question of the extent to which NATO, on the basis of 
UN Resolution 1368 or in other contexts, can become involved in the fight 
against terrorism. Germany regards the primacy of the United Nations as 
absolute in this respect. 
German membership of the European Union. In its foreign policy, Ger-
many is bound by the common foreign and security policy under Article 11 
of the EU Treaty. A great deal of German activity in the field of foreign 
policy is therefore devoted to participation in the formulation of this for-
eign and security policy, which is then implemented by the Member States, 
the Commission or the High Representative for the CFSP. In conjunction 
with the primacy of the United Nations and its Security Council in the do-
main of anti-terrorist policy, Article 19(2) of the EU Treaty clearly restricts 
Germany’s powers in the framework of the common foreign and security 
policy of the EU in relation to those vested in Britain and France as perma-
nent members of the Security Council. The policies of those two States in 
practice shows the limits of the common foreign and security policy of the 
EU in the context of the United Nations. 
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Germany’s participation in the military operations conducted in pursuance 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1368. Since October 2001 it has made 
some 3,000 service personnel available for Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and since the beginning of 2002 it has provided about 700 troops for ISAF. 
Germany also played a major part in the political moves to establish a vi-
able government in Afghanistan, hosting the Petersberg Conference. 
Particular importance attaches to the way in which the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany has acted in connection with the policy of the 
international community towards Iraq. Iraq is not cooperating in the meas-
ures taken by the international community to combat global terrorism. 
There is good reason to suspect that Iraq, by developing nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons, is preparing to commit acts of state terrorism or to 
engage in military operations based on the use of these weapons or at least 
to threaten their use for political purposes. Since Iraq has been resisting 
precautionary inspections by the international community since 1998, the 
United States has initiated a global political discussion regarding the mili-
tary action that may have to be taken against Iraq. The alternative to mili-
tary action is renewed Iraqi acceptance of UN monitors. From the very start 
of these global deliberations, the German Government has put its faith in a 
diplomatic and political solution, based on successful – and thus unim-
peded – inspections. Contacts with the Arab States, and especially with the 
Arab League, have been one of the principal means through which the 
German Government has tried to implement this policy. 
The Federal Chancellor’s public declaration that Germany would not be a 
party to a military solution is significant from various perspectives: 
In the global political discussion on military actions against Iraq, the Chan-
cellor’s statement, in marked contrast to the position of the U.S. Admini-
stration, expressed the belief that political and diplomatic efforts could bear 
fruit, whereas the U.S. Administration has effectively ruled out the possi-
bility that such a policy might succeed and is fixed on the idea that there is 
virtually no alternative to military action. Following the adoption of UN 
Resolution 1441 (2002) in November 2002, it remains to be seen how suc-
cessful the position on Iraq that has now been unanimously adopted by the 
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international community will prove to be in bringing weapons of mass de-
struction under control without recourse to military action. 
The Federal Chancellor’s statement constitutes open intergovernmental dia-
logue too, diverging from the practice of confining this type of discussion 
to more or less secret diplomacy. If democratic decisions are to be made 
transparently, including decisions on the use of military force – a precept 
anchored in German constitutional practice whereby parliamentary ap-
proval is required for the deployment of the Federal Armed Forces abroad 
– public dialogue between democratic governments is a logical necessity. 
In this respect, derogatory references to the special situation of election 
campaigns are unacceptable to anyone with a realistic understanding of 
democracy. Participation in the democratic process and the legitimization 
of governments are effected by means of elections, and elections presup-
pose an intensification of the public debate on key issues.  
Notwithstanding the German Government’s endorsement of UN Resolution 
1441 (2002), the Chancellor’s statement raises the question of Germany’s 
ability to take part in further international military operations. This question 
mark over German military capabilities relates both to manpower and 
matériel as well as to the acceptance by the German population. 
In terms of actual force size, Germany now provides the second-largest 
contingent of armed troops for operations abroad. Besides their involve-
ment in Enduring Freedom and ISAF, German troops are also serving in 
Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, etc. A total of some 9,500 Ger-
man service personnel are currently assigned to international forces. 
The issue of public acceptance has a historical and an economic or fiscal 
dimension. Experiences of two world wars and their consequences, the col-
lective historical awareness and, in some cases, first-hand knowledge of the 
suffering and destruction caused by wars have made European societies 
sceptical about military solutions. This distinguishes them from U.S. soci-
ety. Germany bears particularly deep scars from its experience of war, both 
as the aggressor and author of incomparable horrors, fruits of the policies 
of Hitler and the National Socialists, and as the victim of expulsions and 
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destruction. This historical dimension determines the attitude of German 
society to military operations. 
The economic situation of the highly developed but also ageing and dwin-
dling German society has created a substantial fiscal burden, and in such 
circumstances securing an increase in the defence budget is virtually a po-
litical impossibility. The reduction of government debt, which is also an 
EU requirement, and the overhaul of the system of social security are al-
ready complicated enough. 
5.2 International policing and world domestic policy 
Since September 11
th, Germany has stepped up its efforts to combat terror-
ism through police operations. This is reflected in two new packages of 
anti-terrorist legislation as well as in German participation in the formula-
tion and implementation of the common justice and home-affairs policy of 
the European Union. It goes without saying that Germany is also a party to 
international agreements on cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
which followed the adoption of UN resolution 1368 (2001). 
5.3 International criminal law 
Germany submits to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and 
has adopted two laws on the subject, the Act Relating to Cooperation with 
the International Criminal Court (Gesetz zum Internationalen Strafgericht-
shof) and the Act Introducing the Code of Crimes against International Law 
(Gesetz zur Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches). With regard to the 
International Criminal Court, there are different positions from those of the 
United States. In the sphere of criminal law, as in other legal fields, Ger-
many will continue to press for a commitment to internationalization. 
5.4 Intercultural dialogue 
Germany takes the view that intercultural dialogue makes an important 
contribution to the prevention of violence, including terrorist violence, in 
the North-South context in general and between the ‘West’ and the cultural 
community of Islam in particular. Efforts are being made not only to           
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proclaim this dialogue but also to conduct it in a serious manner. Intercul-
tural dialogue should not be categorized primarily as an element of the in-
ter-faith dialogue but should be conducted between governments and repre-
sentatives of the respective societies and focus on the possibility of identi-
fying common values. 
5.5 Socio-economic cooperation 
Socio-economic cooperation conducted with the aim of reducing the pros-
perity gap between the richer North American and European countries and 
most of the other regions of the world must be part of the strategy for suc-
cessfully combating terrorism. The German Government tries to pursue this 
aim through its policy of development cooperation, supporting structural 
change in societies that could otherwise become breeding grounds for ter-
rorism. In this way it seeks to ensure that terrorism cannot even begin to 
take root in states and societies. Development cooperation is intended to 
help countries to overcome the repercussions of political crises and to 
eradicate the structural causes of terrorism. Development policy offers de-
cisive and effective approaches to preventive action against terrorism. 
Combating poverty, improving basic education, increasing the level of pub-
lic participation in decision-making processes, preventing situations that 
create refugees and supporting democratization and the rule of law are key 
principles in this concept of development cooperation. This understanding 
of German development cooperation is reflected in Germany’s policy on 
Afghanistan. Since the beginning of 2002, hospitals and other health 
amenities in Afghanistan have been renovated and equipped, drinking-
water supplies have been restored and school buildings rehabilitated. Edu-
cation, legal advice and the establishment of networks for women are being 
supported; this is one of the main ‘cultural’ priorities. Salaries for more 
than 450,000 teachers and policemen are being paid out. These contribu-
tions are being made in cooperation with both government bodies and or-
ganizations within civil society. 
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5.6 Relations between Europe and the neighbouring region of the 
Middle East and Southern Mediterranean 
Next to active involvement in global policymaking, the foremost mission of 
European foreign and security policy is to shape the relationship between 
Europe and the States of the neighbouring region of the Middle East and 
Southern Mediterranean.  
Developing a blueprint for relations between these regional neighbours has 
only been possible since the end of the East-West conflict. Only then could 
the international political community address the core conflict in the Mid-
dle East between Israel and the Arab and Islamic countries, with all due 
respect to the Camp David Agreement of 1978. Historical facts have played 
their part, both in this core Middle East conflict and in its exploitation by 
East and West before 1989: the colonization of the region by European 
States, namely Britain, France and Italy, and its liberation from their rule. 
And then there is the unspeakable horror of the holocaust set in motion by 
Fascist Germany, which claimed the lives of millions of Jews and made an 
Israeli State a historical necessity. The Israeli understanding of statehood 
and security is also rooted in this apocalyptic historical experience. The 
facts of history, in their respective dimensions, create not only a European 
but also a specifically German responsibility for the conflict in the Middle 
East – a responsibility to Israel but also, inseparably linked with this, a re-
sponsibility to the Arabs too.  
The East-West conflict superimposed its rationale not only on the core 
Middle East conflict but also on conflicts within the Arab world and con-
flicts between and within other Islamic States, such as the war between Iran 
and Iraq, the tensions between Turkey on the one hand and Iraq and Syria 
on the other, and the hostilities in Afghanistan between 1980 and 1990. 
The end of the East-West conflict resulted almost directly in two events 
that changed the Middle East and Gulf region:  
-  the intervention of the United States in Iraq on the side of Kuwait with 
the consent of the UN Security Council, and  
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-  the establishment of contractual relations between Israel and the Pal-
estinians as the key prerequisite for a solution to the core Middle East 
conflict.  
Both events were of global significance in that they revealed the contours 
of a new world order:  
In institutional terms, power lies with the more effective international or-
ganizations – primarily with the United Nations but also with other organi-
zations, particularly the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
the World Trade Organization. 
In terms of the projection of political power, the United States had become 
the world’s only superpower.  
The increasing regionalization of global relations has subsequently resulted 
in the emergence of interests that are determined by the relations between 
regional neighbours. They can give rise both to conflict and to cooperation 
between neighbouring regions. This phenomenon also applies to relations 
between Europe and the neighbouring Middle East and Southern Mediter-
ranean. In this context there is a two-way pull between adaptation to the 
hegemonic role of the United States – a prospect which Israel, in particular, 
would welcome but which attracts Arab condemnation – and the develop-
ment of a network of bi-regional relations. The choice between these two 
opposites is primarily determined by geopolitical circumstances, i.e. by the 
differing interests of Europe and the United States in relation to the Middle 
East and Gulf region: 
The United States, as the only military power with such potential to 
threaten the use of force, can bring influence to bear on tensions within the 
Middle East and Gulf region as well as between Europe and that region, but 
the exertion of that influence is affected by the United States’ own geo-
strategic interests.  
The policies pursued by the EU Member States on relations with the neigh-
bouring States of the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean were 
institutionalized in the Barcelona process and in the cooperation between 
the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Both of 
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of these processes are handicapped by the Arab-Israeli conflict, increas-
ingly so since September 11
th with the escalation of violence on both sides. 
Progress is now largely confined to economic cooperation, but no advances 
are being made towards comprehensive political or security cooperation. 
At the start of 2002 there did seem to be progress towards a solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, which would have helped to reconcile the conflicting 
interests of the United States and Europe and paved the way for closer 
Euro-Arab political cooperation. The proposed negotiating basis was the 
plan put forward by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia for a Palestinian-
Israeli deal. The coordinated action of the Middle East Quartet, comprising 
the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia, has 
been a great step forward in procedural terms. But now the Iraq crisis has 
become a stumbling block. Nevertheless, the efforts of the Quartet to pro-
duce a ‘road map’ remain essential.  
In view of the disruptive impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, relations be-
tween the Arab and European States could benefit from diversification at a 
level below that of the Barcelona process. To this end, contacts between the 
various governments, at the subregional and local levels and between 
groups from civil society should be intensified. 
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September 11 – Consequences for Ger-
man Foreign Policy 
I. The terrorist aggression against the United States has strongly influenced 
not only US foreign policy but the North Atlantic alliance and the transat-
lantic relation-ship, often described in the past as „partnerschip“ or „com-
munity“, but not really defined as such. September 11, 2001 was a defining 
moment in history, when relations between countries, international constel-
lations and strategic conditions change: For America and for Europe 
„common security“ took on a new meaning, since the significance of the 
mutual alliance obligations was clarified in the light of the event and in the 
perspective of Ame-rican reactions to a renewable threat from abroad by an 
elusive enemy without an address and not identifiable with any country. 
The fact that the aggression came from a „non-state actor“ in Afghanistan, 
in other words an underground organisation or private international com-
pany of terrorists waging „war on America“, as president Bush put it in de-
fining the nature of the attack and the consequences he would draw from it, 
has changed the rules of international security and of alliance politics, af-
fected the reading and application of international law and created new 
connections in the „international coalition against terror“ be-yond the po-
litical confines of existing alliances. The „global war“ coalition has allied – 
for the time being – the United States with Russia and China, India and 
Pakistan and unlikely partners in Central Asia with Usbekistan and 
Tadshikistan or North Africa with terror-torn Algeria – all under 
dictatorships – for the single purpose of acting with force against „inter-
national terrorism“.  September 11 – Consequences for German Foreign Policy 
Most of these „coalition partners“ or new allies outside Europe have au-
thoritarian governments with intolerant religious-social orders such as 
Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia (both of dubious reliability as an ally against 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and of fragile internal stability under pres-
sure) or with secular states in Muslim countries, governed by state-uni-ty 
parties and the military such as Egypt, Algeria and Syria, all of them not 
much different from Iraq but for the personality of the dictator in Bagdad 
and the use of terror as an instrument of government. Syria, already a reluc-
tant Gulf war ally against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, is still 
counted as one of the potential recipients of nuclear devices, also in posses-
sion of chemical arms and a buyer of ex-Soviet „Scud“ type missiles from 
North Korea’s production. 15 „Scud“ missiles with conventional warheads 
were ordered by Jemen in North Korea and shipped from there in early de-
cember 2002: The US had to let the shipment, first seized by Spanish fri-
gattes in the Arabian Sea, continue to Aden after an aknowledgement by 
the „coalition partner“ Jemen and a protest by the Jemenite government, 
cooperating in the search for „Al Qaida“ activists. The growing concern 
about terrorism has brought this strange collection of temporary allies in 
line around the United States, however without much coherence and com-
mon interests beyond the fight against Islamic fundamentalism in its terror-
ist extreme, to which most of these governments add their own Islamic op-
position as do Russia and China, while others are either dependant on ar-
rangements with the islamists or in an ambivalent relationship with ultra-
fundamentalist Islamic clerics like the House of Saud with the king head of 
the Wahabbite sect, which is the state religion in Saudi-Arabia.  
This ambiguity of the US coalition policy as an exemple of pragmatic real-
politik beyond all principles and „common values“ of the transatlantic 
„community“ between North America and Europe has strongly influenced 
German reactions to summary definitions of „international terrorism“ and 
„islamist“ dangers as expressions of the US political requirements for the 
conduct of military operations overseas, although there is general agree-
ment with the urgency of „ the fight against terrorism“ and the use of force. 
However, the Oriental wing of the „international coalition“, brought to-
gether by the US, is regarded with skepticism in Germany and jugded in 
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Berlin as an incoherent and probably ephemerial association of national, 
governmental or dynastic interests, incompatible with a clear orientation 
and a long term political strategy. 
Only Europe stands out in this coalition as congenial to America in the es-
sentials, even if the mentalities are different on both sides of the Atlantic as 
they are between Britain and the Continent. „post-September 11“ attitudes 
brought out these differences as to the use of force and the concept of of-
fensive war as the necessary or at least optimal response to the terrorist 
threat and the threat of proliferation of means of mass destruction with the 
hypothetical combination of both as a worst case assumption, personified 
by Saddam Hussein of Iraq – in president Bush’s words „the most danger-
ous dictator with the most dangerous weapons“. In this sense the terrorist 
attack on America has changed international politics and introduced a new 
structural element, which, however, is not the only defining one since other 
factors remain in play for alignments in alliances and coalition-building, for 
conflicts of national interests, international rivalries, strategic competition 
and not least confrontations between powers for classical geopolitical rea-
sons such as territory (India versus Pakistan) or resources or the control of 
regional balances. But the „notable change“ in international security condi-
tions, noted by US defence secretary Rumsfeld in 2002, which he described 
as the constant threat to populations by massive terror attacks including 
with means of mass destruction without international war between coun-
tries, has introduced a factor of generalized insecurity and uncertainty, era-
dicating the clear-cut difference between peace and a state of war. Such 
situations of endemic large-scale violence and in-security did exist before, 
especially in Asia and Africa, but in American perception they had re-
mained a distant danger. Germany had had its share of terrorism, not all of 
it domestic, some from the Near East and North Africa. However Germany 
was more concerned by the recent „Al Qaida“ infiltration than other Euro-
pean countries, since the authors of September 11, had prepared their act, at 
least partly, in Hamburg and travelled widely from Germany through 
Europe. The all too liberal German laws and practice of justice made their 
covert operations easier than elsewhere. Therefore, after September 11, 
Germany was more exposed to American pressure and criticism than other 
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European countries. Germany had perhaps to do more than others to correct 
its record on anti-terror precautions and active persuit of terrorists. 
II. For the North Atlantic Alliance „September 11“ brought a brusque acce-
leration of its own evolution towards „globalism“. The Balkan wars since 
1991 had finally prompted the first use of force by Nato in 1995 to end the 
Bosnian war and in 1999 to end the Kosovo conflict, but these two armed 
interventions took place in Europe on the border of the alliance and chal-
lenged the political credibility of the allies as signatories of the „Final Act“ 
of the Helsinki CSCE in 1975 (signed for Yugoslavia by Tito) and of the 
Paris „Charter for a New Europe“ in 1990. With the „global war on terror“ 
(Bush) and the armed intervention in Afghanistan against the Taliban ré-
gime and the „Al Qaida“ organisation, which was a leading part of the Isla-
mist dictatorship, the European allies, including Germany, went beyond the 
legal and geopolitical limits of their treaty obligations by a lar-ge interpre-
tation of the North Atlantic Pact (the Washington treaty) and they went to 
war in Asia. Terrorism had finally become a serious challenge to interna-
tional security and was recognized as such both by the UN and by Nato. 
That Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington would be invoked to counter a 
lesser threat than that of a war in Europe had been considered a highly un-
likely contingency through the entire period of the East-West conflict after 
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Although this European support since 
september 2001 was marginal in military terms, it was of great political 
importance not only to Europe but to the United States. The later US re-
quests for specific assistance by Nato allies in the „war against terrorism“ 
and in 2002 in support of a military intervention against Iraq in order to 
forcefully disarm it and remove Saddam Hussein, clearly show that the US 
depends on able and willing allies to manage international crises and that 
Europe is in a geo-strategic key position with regard to the Middle East for 
deployments and logistical sup-port of US intervention forces as was the 
case in 1990-91 during the Gulf conflict. In Europe Germany still held a 
significant central position in 2002 as a major Nato ally with the US bases 
and communications and the rest of the US forces with 42.000 army plus 
15.000 air force personnel and 57 % of the US army prepositioned stocks 
for the planned contingency reinforcements of the V corps in West Ger-
  25Lothar Rühl 
many by two brigades: The bulk of US Command Europe was still garri-
soned in Germany. 
III. The consequences for German foreign policy must be considered under 
several distinct major aspects: 
-  German-American relations and German influence in Washington, 
-  Germany’s standing and role in Nato in the transformation process,  
-  the impact of the US concept for „pre-emptive prevention“ strategy, 
-  the adaptation of the ESDP to preventive military intervention,  
-  the consequences for EU enlargement and the problem of Turkey, 
-  the German position in the UN and participation in UN crisis man-
agement. 
In his first public reaction to the September 11 attack German chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder assured the US of „Deutschlands uneingeschränkte Soli-
darität“. The German word „uneingeschränkt“ translates into English either 
as „unlimited“ or as „unrestricted“, which is essentially the same. In the 
context of aggression from abroad against an ally this expression of full 
support was both a necessity and a statement expected of every American 
ally in Nato, in particular in view of the NAC’s decision on september 12, 
to proclaim the allies’solidarity and to invoke article 5 of the 1949 alliance 
Treaty of Washington with the ruling that in this case the mutual obligation 
of the allies to support each other in „collective self-defence“ against ag-
gression with the appropriate means and measures including armed force 
does apply. Once the foreign origin of the terrorst attack had been estab-
lished, the articles 4 to 6 of the treaty came into play, binding, in priciple, 
all members of the alliance. Even if US territory had not been struck, but a 
US ship or aircraft within the treaty area including the Mediterranean in-
stead, the obligation for support would have applied in the same way, ac-
cording to article 6 of the treaty. For exemple: Had the US destroyer 
„Cole“, some time before, in the year 2000, the target of terrorists, not been 
attacked as it anchored in the territorial waters of Jemen but in a Turkish 
port or on a sea station in the Mediterranean, this would have constituted 
the ‘casus foederis’ for Nato as well, even if the impact would have been as 
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marginal as it was outside the treaty area. In this case, Nato could have re-
sponded with an armed attack in „collective self-defence“ according to ar-
ticle 51 UN Charter if it had concluded that Jemen was responsible. 
A classic military contingency of armed attack on Nato territory had al-
ready been envisaged by the NAC in 1990-91 for the defence of Turkey 
against a possible Iraqi strike on US/Nato bases or simply on Turkish terri-
tory across the common border in response to the intervention of the inter-
national coalition with the operations „Desert Shield“ and „Desert Storm“, 
although Turkey then was not part of this American-led coalition, only ma-
de available its airspace and permitted the use of the bases for air attacks on 
Iraq. In this Nato „flank contingency“ on the Southern periphery of Europe 
and the Nato treaty area, which is limited in the Near/Middle East by 
Turkey’s borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran, units of the „Allied Mobile 
Force“ were deployed as a demonstration of force and a preventive warning 
to deter a possible Iraqi counter-attack and in case it materialized to rein-
force Turkish defence. German air defence units and light fighter-bombers 
took part in this preventive forward deployment for defence, which was not 
part of any offensive plan for an invasion of Iraq: During „Desert Storm“ 
the Turkish-Iraqi border region remained quiet (apart from the usual local 
attacks by the Turkish-Kurdish PKK from Northern Iraq across the border). 
The politically important aspect of this crisis action by Nato with German 
military participation was the reinforcement of the allied defence posture 
on the exposed flank of Nato, while Germany and Turkey did not actively 
participate in the military operations and Germany even refused to send 
mine-hunters into the Red Sea, as Washington had asked Bonn to do, in 
order to keep the shipping save. The only German military contribution 
was to replace allied wareships in the Estern Mediterranean during the con-
flict in order to protect the sea-lanes between Europe and the Levant. On 
the other hand Germany supported the US indirectly by sending US and 
German warstocks, i.p. ammunition, helping in the transport of the US VII 
corps from Germany to Saudi-Arabia and later providing arms for the mod-
ernization of Turkish and Egyptian military equipments (all in all including 
payments to the US about 17 Mrd DM). Germany was the central rotation 
base for US and British forces and logistics during the Gulf war. All the 
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other European Nato allies somehow participated in the Gulf war opera-
tions with mostly small naval or air units, Britain and France with larger 
ground forces contingents and air force squadrons, which took part in the 
offensive. Germany remained in the background. 
The German abstinence then caused a temporary freeze in German partici-
pation in military co-operation in Nato, although Nato as a military alliance 
for defence and its command & control structures did not go to war in the 
Middle East for political reasons, i.p. not to make it appear that the alliance 
had an active interest in the Gulf region and not to provoke the Arab mem-
bers of the international coalition to withdraw because of Nato military pre- 
sence in the Middle East beyond the alliance confines. 
Ten years later, in september 2001, Iraq was at first not in the centre or 
even in the fore- ground of the breaking crisis and hence not on top of the 
allied political agenda, no obvious link existing at the time between Iraq 
and the Islamist terrorists (although soon after Washington affirmed, on the 
strength of secret intelligence information from Prague, that one of the au-
thors of the terrorist attacks had met there with Iraqi agents). Anyway the 
American suggestion, according to which Saddam Hussein might have hel-
ped the Islamist terrorists to attack America (Bush:“I would not put it past 
him“), did not seem plausible in Europe: Why would the dictator in Bag-
dad, who had massive problems with the shiites of his country and for 
whom any kind of Islamic fundamentalism, especially with terrorist activi-
ties, would mean an uncontrollable danger for his own régime, risk punitive 
retalliation by the US for any contact with „Al Qaida“ or other Islamist ter-
rorist groups? When it comes to using terrorists for his purposes he had 
Arab, above all Palestinian, clients to do his work. Therefore, as long as 
neither Iraq nor any other Arab state or Iran were targets of US „counter-
terrorist“ actions, Germany could simply lay back and protect German po-
litical and economic interests in the Middle East as did all the other Eu-
ropean countries, Britain temporarily excepted, for theirs (i.p. France). 
Chancellor Schröder had always put forward „the German national inter-
est“ and he would do so again in 2002, when Iraq had been promoted to the 
top of the US list of „rogue states“, a denomination first used by the Clin-
ton Administration in december 1993 to designate states which would pro-
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mote terrorism and act as proliferators of nuclear, chemical or biological 
„means of mass destruction“; the then US secretary of defence L. Aspin put 
forward the scenario of „a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue 
states or even terrorists“ as a „new threat“ the US would have „to deal 
with“ by a „Defense Counterproliferation Initiative“.Thus the link between 
such dangerous states and terrorism had been established in official US 
thinking and planning long before George Bush jun. became president. As-
pins successors used the term „rogue states“ freely, when addressing 
proliferation risks and the policies of North Koea, Iran, Iraq, Libya or Sy-
ria. The US State Department later changed „rogue states“ to „states of 
concern“, which might be either „failed states“, „failing states“ or „aggres-
sive states“ and even „terrorist states“ without stringent definitions. The 
Bush administration then returned to „rogue states“, which had remained 
the term used by the last defence secretary of president Clinton, William 
Cohen, even as late as february 2001 in his valedictory addresses in Europe 
on leaving office. The expression was used to recom-mend anti-ballistic 
missile defence against „rogue missiles launched by rogue states“ (Cohen 
in Munich 2/2/2001 ). The main US concern at that time was clearly about 
Iraq and North Korea. 
By the fall of 2002 the European allies had not yet to worry about an excur-
sion of the American „campaign against terror“ into Iraq as long as Saddam 
Hussein remained passive and no material evidence of Iraqi links with ter-
rorists or of Iraqi armament with MMD and longer range missiles turned 
up. It was clear, however, that Iraq remained in the line of fire, while Af-
ghanistan was the obvious first priority for US intervention, Sudan, Jemen 
and Somalia possible second line choices, depending on developments 
there and implantation of Islamist terrorist groups in one of these three 
countries. 
Hence, on september 12, 2001 chancellor Schröder could still concentrate 
on the „war on terror“ in general. In this contingency without geographical 
specifications or naming of any country by the US administration the head 
of the German government offered the American ally „jede gewünschte 
Hilfe“, which means in English „any and every kind of desired help“ or 
assistance. His discourse in the policy statement focussed on a rather nar-
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row mission, however: „the identification and persuit of the authors of the-
se acts of terrorism, including those who instigated and instructed them“. 
The latter Schröder called „the wire-pullers“ and the terrorist acts of 
september 11 „a declaration of war against the entire civilised world. He 
said so even before president Bush qualified them as „acts of war“ later in 
the day. In his speech to the Bundestag the German chancellor underlined 
their international sifnificance in stating that „security in our world cannot 
be divided“. This was both a wide-ranging and somewhat ambiguous 
statement of assistance to America in the fight against international terror-
ism and for its national defence: On the one hand, meeting any demand of 
„desired help“ with unqualified solidarity, on the other hand pointing to a 
defined - the mission of seeking out those responsible for the terrorist at-
tacks either as the physical agents or as instigators and instructors. This 
formula, used by an experienced lawyer and politician, suggested less a 
military assistance, let alone participation in a war with German forces out-
side Europe than support of intelligence and police operations to find indi-
viduals and underground groups.  
On that first day after the attack president Bush followed the same line wi-
thout mentioning countries or even regions. „The enemy“ he spoke of in his 
first Washington address, remained without a name, which was consistent 
with the early stage of the beginning campaign, when knowledge about this 
enemy was still sketchy. The enemy was hiding „in refuges“, but Bush did 
not indicate where these might be found. Hence, „unlimited support“ for 
the US by Germany or any other ally came cheap in terms of practical sup-
port and alliance policies, though it was obvious from the first hour that 
September 11 had come as a defining moment in history and as a test of 
solidarity as well as of resolve for all allies and clients of America. It was 
understood that way in Berlin as everywhere else. The question, whether a 
new structural element had been introduced into the set-up of factors of in-
ternational politics and security, was soon afterwards answered by the 
American reactions to this aggression: The US saw itself, as president Bush 
had proclaimed, „at war“ and was prepared to conduct an military cam-
paign across international borders in a worldwide persuit of the September 
terrorists, which could mean intervention with armed force, however small 
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or large, according to the requirements of the circumstances, and in the ex-
treme case a global campaign by installments and stages from suspect area 
to suspect area. This was indeed the meaning of Bush’s warning to the 
American nation that „a long campaign“ lay before them. His appeal that 
this was the time for all good people to come to the help of the party was 
also addressed to the allies and friends of America to take sides: „with us or 
against us“. So far, alliances and coalitions had been formed either for 
long-term purposes of collective defence and common security or for ad 
hoc-purposes vis-a-vis certain adversaries with a political address and with 
precise objectives for joint action, identifiable within international fron-
tiers. In this new case of „internationbal terrorism“ and the use of force to 
eliminate this danger of insidious aggression across borders and oceans, to 
destroy conspiracies and underground networks including their financial 
and logistical underpinning, international relations would be changed as 
would international law and the difference between peace and war would 
be affected as would the difference between defense and offensive warfare.  
One year later, the Bush administration’s new „National Security Strategy“ 
of september 2002 spelled out „offensive defense“ and „anticipatory re-
sponse“ to terrostist threats, i.p. with nuclear, chemical or biological means 
of mass destruction, as the core of a new doctrine for „pre-emptive preven-
tion“. Pre-emptive and punitive use of US forces, including with nuclear 
arms, as a complement to deterrence, out-reaching, wide-ranging mobile 
forward defence beyond the American continent on strategic fore-fields 
overseas as a complement to perimeter defence in North America and 
within the North-Atlantic treaty area, are the strategic consequences for the 
US and for Nato, once it were called upon to join the action in the outside 
world. These specifications were not explicit in september 2001, however, 
the thinking about such a new global intervention and counter-proliferation 
strategy by military intervention in Washington had been known latest 
since the mid-1990ies, when president Clinton was in office. The German 
governments had been aware of this novel strategic thinking, but there had 
been no political challenge yet to anticipate its results and their conse-
quences for the alliance. 
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Of all cabinets in Bonn and Berlin, the Schröder government was the least 
prepared to face such consequences in time. When the new situation broke 
as the lightning struk (to quote Bush’s words in the context of the discus-
sion on pre-emption „do not wait until the lightning strikes“) all the Euro-
pean allies were still occupied with implementing the recommen-dations of 
the Nato report on „Lessons learned“ from the Kosovo war of 1999 for the 
re-structuring and re-equipment of their Nato forces. On international secu-
rity the minds were fixed on the Balkans and the concerns were on the es-
calating warlike situation in Palestine since the late summer of 2000 and 
the persistance of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The Schröder government had been subjected to its first test of the cohe-
sion of its majority in the Bundestag after the Kosovo war over a minor is-
sue of peace support in Macedonia by sending a small contingent of Ger-
man troops to help stabilize the situation: The chancellor had to ask for a 
confidence vote to rally his majority. His foreign minister Fischer called 
this assignment an operation „to prevent civil war“. September 11, 2001 
therefore brought a formidable risk to the accident-prone and fragile „red-
green“ governing coalition in Berlin. Relations with the US, participation 
in international peace support operations and Nato actions with military 
force, the relations between the new European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) with its planned crisis response force and Nato were in the centre 
of German foreign policy preoccupations. In summa, the entire foreign and 
security policy of Germany was suddenly at stake again, only two years 
after the successful policy during the Kosovo war. 
On september 19 chancellor Schröder made a second statement of policy to 
the Bundestag on behalf of his government, addressing the terrorist issue 
and the international situation, in which he specified the practical meaning 
of „unlimited solidarity“ with America in political and legal terms within 
the context of the alliance, i.p. article 5 of the treaty, and the UN, based on 
the security council resolution 1368, unanismously adopted on september 
12. The chancellor invoked this resolution and quoted one of its key pra-
graphs which states that „terrorist acts“ also constitute a „threat to world 
peace and international security“ in terms of the UN Charter and recog-
niozes „the natural rights“ of member countries to „individual and collec-
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tive self-defence“ against such threats „with all means conform to the UN 
Charter“. Schröder interpreted the meaning of this wording as „a further 
development of the hitherto existing international law“ („eine 
Weiterentwicklung des bisherigen Völkerrechts“), which, in his view, 
created „the legal pre-conditions for decisive, even military action against 
terrorism“. He called this „the decisive new“ element and added that from 
this point on the UN and Nato were in unison qualifying terrorist attacks 
from abroad as aggression. He followed up in stating that the NAC had 
rightfully and „with Germany’s full support“ equalled this attack on the US 
as an attack on „all Nato partners“ and that all allies were equally 
concerned by it and by further threats of this kind. In his view this was 
„consistent with the spirit and the letter“ of the 1949 Washington treaty, 
and in this context Schröder specified that „unlimited solidarity“ with the 
US extends to „decisive actions against states, which lend assistance and 
refuge to the criminals, and that in practical terms the allied solidarity 
„could include military support“. Such support would be given „under the 
legal cover by the UN“ with the consent by the Bundestag in accordance 
with German constitutional law. The dutied of an ally, however, had a 
counter-part within the alliance: „information and consultation (on) all 
necessary measures“.  At this point the chancellor introduced his crucial caveat, which drew the 
line of „unlimited solidarity“ and of „full support“ for the US, which set the 
tone for his future argument against unconditional and unlimited engage-
ment in military action one year later during the critical phase of his re-
election campaign of 2002: „Germany is ready to take risks, military ones 
as well, but not for adventures“. He added: „Thanks to the prudent attitude 
of the US government these will not be asked of us. I think that this will 
remain so“. What one year later hurt president Bush’s feelings and caused 
deep irritations in Washington with the German chancellor and his party, 
the word „adventures“, publicly used to justify German non-participation in 
any military operation against Iraq and linked by Schröder in electoral 
rhetoric to the danger of war, he would keep Germany out of, if re-elected, 
was in the chancellors discourse one year earlier, when Iraq was not yet an 
explicit issue of US po-licy in connection with „the fight against interna-
tional terrorism“. 
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One may assume that the reasons for Schröders attitude were domestic, that 
he was driven by concerns about party unity behind his government and 
coalition politics with his „green“ partner, which is an emanation of the so-
called „peace movement“ and „anti-nuclear“ po- pulist movement of the 
1970/80ies, still mired on neutrality and pacifist ideals, inspite of foreign 
minister Fischer’s turn towards pragmatic realpolitik in 1999. But it should 
be noted that Schröder and Fischer would never rely on the use of force as 
the first option or as the only solution to an international problem. On sep-
tember 19, 2001 Schröder summed up his government’s position in the new 
crisis situation in these words, following the pattern of his policy during the 
Kosovo war in 1999: „Our aim must be to integrate, if possible, all coun-
tries into a worldwide system of security and wealth. For this purpose we 
want to offer further inducives to states, which declare themselves ready 
for co-operation in the fight against terrorism. For the crisis regions of the 
Near East and Central Asia we must open perspectives for political and 
econimic stabilization and stability, for peace and develop- ment“. To this 
he added: „Above all, we must join our efforts in doing everything to 
achieve the break-through to peace in the Near East“ indeed a condition for 
success in overcoming Arab and Muslim terrorism and avoiding an escala-
tion of a war with Iraq through the Middle East, the contingency most fea-
red in Europe as in the region itself. 
When one considers all these elements, one is looking at Schröder’s and 
Fischer’s approach to the international problems posed to Germany’s for-
eign policy in crucial areas: 
Political solidaity, conditional and limited participation in military opera-
tions, only under a UN „mandate“ and in an alliance framework, preferably 
in a European formation such as EU crisis reaction forces, multilateral 
policies of stabilization and co-operative economic development, for 
international systems of collective security on the model of the UN or the 
OSCE. This is what usually is meant in German political language by „pre-
vention“ with „preventive force deployments“ in crisis areas and „preven-
tive diplomacy“ in line with the 1992 UN Security Council’s Boutros-Ghali 
„Agenda for Peace“ and the 1992 „Petersberg Tasks“ for the WEU, which 
have been written into the Amsterdam EU treaty for timely if robust 
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„peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-consolidation“, including by 
„combat missions“. But in German official thinking the latter should best 
be left to Nato forces or to coalitions for specific purposes under the aus-
pices of the UN, since they represent the ex-treme commitment of military 
means on the high end of the escalation ladder, where the heavier and more 
risky missions wait for „the able and willing“ under the conduct by a vo-
lonteer „lead nation“ for international „peace support“ and active „crisis 
management“.  
For the dominant German philosophy on international security, „preven-
tion“ certainly has never meant „preventive use of force“, as spelled out 
one year later, in september 2002, by the Bush administration’s new doc-
trine in the US „National Security Strategy“ document with such terms as 
„pre-emptive prevention“, „anticipatory“ response to acute threats and „of-
fensive defense“ of North America. These spearheads of active deterrence 
and wideranging forward defence, coercive and punitive use of force were 
not on the books of German foreign policy, not even after the Bosnian and 
Kosovo experiences 1995-99. September 11 changed the priorities some-
what, but not entirely. At the end of the Kosovo war, in june 1999 German 
foreign minister Fischer proposed a „Stability Pact for South Eastern Euro-
pe“ in order to add a peaceful development programme to the military 
intervention. This proposal, adopted by the EU, Nato, the UN and the US 
as well as by Russia, which would have to be implemented by international 
co-operation, including Serbia, was a complement to the use of force and a 
demonstration of Germany’s preference for peaceful po- litical solutions to 
conflicts. Alle countries of the Balkans and the Danube were to be associ-
ated with this typically German scheme, that, if really implemented, would 
need a very large investment in the region with contributions by all. The 
Clinton administration, however, made in clear that the US, having to bear 
the main burden for the Kosovo war, would not financially contribute. 
Fischer repeated this scheme in late 2001 for Afghanistan with the „Peters-
berg conference“ for a similar programme to set up and stabilize a provi-
sional government in Kabul and reach agreement between „the donors“ for 
international financial and economic assistance for reconstruction and re-
forms. Both initiatives had domestic and international reasons: Internally to 
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reconsolidate the unity of the governing coalition, shaken by German par-
ticipation in military operations – in 1999 in the air campaign against Ser-
bia of „Allied Force“, later over the troop deployment to Macedonia in 
2000/2001 and later in that year in allied forward deployments to Kuwait, 
East Africa and the Arabian Sea – and rally its majority in the Bundestag. 
The exercise was repeated by „Petersberg-II“ in 2002 for a reconfirmation 
of the agreed programmes after the general elections, which were domi-
nated by Schröders ‘peace or war’ gambit on Iraq, with wich he won a 
small majority in parliament. The SPD party chairman had addressed the 
Iraq issue for that purpose in the oversimplified terms, he chose with an 
appeal to the voters and especially to the Eastern electorate, still precondi-
tioned by the affects against Nato and the US, that are the lasting inheritage 
of Communist propaganda in the ex-GDR. Internationally it was advanta-
geous to put Germany in a high profile position at the UN and in the EU as 
a model for promotion of peaceful conflict resolution and economic devel-
opment. To balance the military means and the German role as „lead na-
tion“ in ISAF for public security in Kabul for six months (in 2003) a visible 
and lasting political role was deemed necessary.  
As time moved on in 2002, the Iraq issue filled the international horizon. 
German participation in the military security management in Afghanistan 
and in naval control east of Africa formed a sizable and useful contribution 
to the „coalition“ effort. But once „the war on terror“ (Bush’s favorite for-
mula for the purpose) moved on to other regions, i.p. the Gulf and Middle 
East, any German active military participation became doubtful. There 
would be no German contingent, however small or inoffensive, within the 
context of an intervention in Iraq, since the chancellor had adamantly ex-
cluded this during his election campaign. This limitation of German mili-
tary contributions was obvious from september 2001 on-wards, even in Af-
ghanistan itself. The Schröder government did not announce at the time – 
early winter 2001 – the deployment and combat role of a small, company-
size unit of German special forces under US command in the mountains of 
the Eastern border region until after the end of „operation Anaconda“ in 
march 2002. The reason for this ambivalence was clear: The government 
did not wish to be drawn into a public debate on German forces in combat 
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and no attention focussed on this aspect of the German role in Afghanistan 
but instead on German robust peace keeping in Kabul, following the pat-
tern set since 1995 in Bosnia and 1999 in Kosovo: Afghanistan in South 
West Asia, half a world away, was and still is no battle ground for German 
combat forces on a larger scale. In order to prevent any development of al-
lied policy in this direction and to keep all options open for the future with 
regard to similar situations in the Middle East, Central Asia or Africa, the 
government sought to forestall any larger or longer commitment in and be-
yond Kabul: This was the main reason for the initial refusal to assume 
command of ISAF as a „lead nation“, when it was first offered Germany as 
successor to Britain. The repeated demand was finally accepted for a joint 
Dutch-German lead role for six months and a prolongation – publicly asked 
for by president Karzai – was refused. 
The policy of reluctant participation and refusal of commitments is visible 
in other areas of international security as well. The reasons are predomi-
nantly domestic and ideological: The German people are not in favour of 
external commitments outside Europe. There is probably no majority to 
sustain an international conflict which would demand its toll on Germany 
in blood, effort and money, at least not as long as Germany were not at-
tacked, i.e. as long as there is no major terrorist aggresion in Germany it-
self. The aversion to war, well understandable and by no means a specific 
German case, the preference for dealing with Iraq or other „proliferators“ 
by negotiations to achieve disarmament, shared by most people in Europe, 
the vague notion, that Islamic terrorism could be somehow overcome or 
deflected from Europe by different policies than those chosen by the Bush 
administration and the US Congress, by „intercultural dialogue“ and eco-
nomic co-operation for a more equitable development – whatever this is 
supposed to mean in practical terms of policy – combine to an affective op-
position, tinged with latent anti-American and anti-capitalist resentments 
on the Democratic Left in Germany as in other West European countries. 
This resistence, difficult to dissolve and impossible to simply circumvene, 
would meet any other government in Berlin as well, its bastion is, however, 
within the parties of the „red-green“ coalition, even if it is much wider than 
the electorates of SPD and the Green Party.  
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It could probably best be overcome by European policies, European unity, 
a European appeal and European armed forces for European security and 
defence. 
III. By the end of 2002, German policy on crisis intervention and conflict 
resolution had come round in a circle to where the preferences of the „red-
green“ coalition had been in 1998, when Schröders election victory ended 
the long rule of the conservative-liberal government: No early use of mili-
tary force and as little engagement of German crisis reaction forces as pos-
sible in compliance with the needs to fulfill alliance obligations in Nato and 
to participate in active crisis management by the EU partners to create the 
desired „European Security and Defence Identity“ as a political configura-
tion of European autonomy vis-a-vis the US in the alliance and the UN. 
Later, after 1999, a planned force goal of 50.000 troops for crisis interven-
tion as the German core contribution to the ESDP „Helsinki Head Goal“ 
for EU crisis response forces (to be met by the end of 2003) corrected the 
government concept in view of safeguarding German influence on the fu-
ture ESDP and contribute to „European autonomy“ in Nato according to 
the principles of the ESDP decision by the EC at Cologne in june 1999 for 
European crisis response forces and the later decisions at Helsinki and 
Nice.  
However this German government policy has remained ambiguous, since 
the necessary finnancial means were not made available either for the mod-
ernization of military equipment and infrastructure or for the creation of an 
effective structure for available ready intervention forces, even if the Ger-
man numerical commitments to the Helsinki Head Goal could be met. The 
„Bundeswehr-Reform“, a patchwork of changes since 1990 with incoherent 
results, still remained an open question at the end of 2002 with uncertain 
trumpets and a foggy perspective. It remained uncertain whether the objec-
tives of the Nato Defence Capability Initiative for the improvement of Al-
lied Forces Europe, decided by the NAC in 1999, will be achieved. In this 
respect, the post-September 11, 2001 situation may yet have a positive im-
pact on European defence planning both in Nato and for the ESDP in the 
EU, if the participating countries commit the resources envisaged and - in 
both cases - formally promised. This is particularly critical to German for-
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eign policy and Germany’s role in Nato and in the EU: A special efforts 
over several years in the order of several billions Euro p.a. would be neces-
sary to lift the German military back at least to the average level of Euro-
pean defence spending and capabilities under changed conditions for de-
fence and security. Intervention capability of the German armed forces in 
partnership with the EU members and Nato allies should be the central aim 
and the top priority. This means an operational and logistical „coalition ca-
pability“ for the use of German force components with US forces on land, 
at sea and in the air, based on readiness, interoperability, mobility, versatil-
ity and sustainability of the forces to be made available for the defined con-
tingencies. 
Here the German case remains critical because of the continuing down-turn 
of the German economy with rising unemployment and budgetary deficits, 
causing the growth of the public debt, increase of taxes and decrease of in-
dividual average purchase power or even income. If these conditions were 
to prevail, the decline of Germany would continue and with it of German 
influence on international security and in Germany’s alliances. 
The German government policy has already been critically affected and 
reduced both in its credibility and in its practical capacity, especially since 
the 2002 election campaign.The deterioration of the American-German re-
lationship since september 2002 is detrimental to Germany’s participation 
in all aspects of international policy and to the German economy. Chancel-
lor Schröder’s formula of „der deutsche Weg“, „the German way“, his pol-
icy would follow in all international situations to serve German national 
interests, was not widely understood as a guaranty offered to Germany’s 
neighbours or partners in the EU, since it reminded them of earlier state-
ments by Schröder about German interests coming first, European interests 
behind, and of German temptations in the more recent past to assume a po-
sition in the centre to balance interests and choose advantages, to dominate 
the situation and to singularize itself, f.e. in dealing with Russia in a bilat-
eral partnership, as offered first by Gorbachev, later by Jeltsin and consis-
tently by Putin, notwithstanding similar Russian  advances to France and 
Britain.  
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In the early 1990ies Polish, Czech and Baltic governments had been con-
cerned about such a perspective, clearly expressed by Polish president Wa-
lensa. Anticipating these concerns, anticipating such fears or pretended 
concerns, chancellor Kohl assured the press in a statement without prior 
question or prodding already in july 1990, after the Moscow meeting with 
Gorbachev, that ideas about a new edition of „Rapallo“ (1920) were „ab-
surd“ because of the European integration in the EC and Germany’s mem-
bership in Nato. However, such and similar concerns , including a political 
horror scenario about „pangermanism“ as a rebirth of all-German imperial-
ism (Italian foreign minister G.Andreotti in 1990), were voiced at the time 
in Paris, London, Rome, den Haag and Brussels by EC partners. British PM 
Margaret Thatcher called for Four-Power-Control of Germany, surveillance 
of a German unification process by the CSCE and a peace treaty with the 
two German states, that would need the consent of all former war enemies 
of Germany to open the road for unification. French president Francois 
Mitterrand warned of „old spectres of European history“ with a „return to 
the past“ and invoked „old alliances“ vis-a-vis Germany in case of German 
national unilateralism. A year later, during the initial Yugoslav crisis, when 
Germany and Austria recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia 
after secession and war single-handed prior to the date, the EC partners had 
fixed for 1992, the Italian government urged for a „Central European“ co-
operation group around Germany in order to build a political barrier against 
the expansion of German influence – a containment strategy that did not 
work out for lack of interested partners but showed the deep-rooted mis-
trust of German ways. The French government tried to support Belgrade’s 
claims to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia and Mitterrand spoke in public 
about „Serbia, France’s historical ally in two wars“ (against Germany). 
A political leader with better feeling for national sensibilities and better un-
derstanding of history and the political realities of Europe would have re-
membered ten years later reactions to German unification and the first ap-
pearances of German „assertiveness“, then a favourite theme of political 
debate in America as in Europe. He might also have remembered president 
Bush sen.’s offer to the RFA in mai 1989 of US-German „partnership in 
leadership“ in dealing with security in Europe. But Schröder had entered 
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the national scene as PM of Lower Saxony for the elections of 1998 with 
only domestic political experience and even the Kosovo conflict, when 
Germany had to join in a war, had obviously not told him the whole lesson. 
The result of his falling-out with Bush jun. over a US policy he seemed to 
judge as „adventure“ in the case of Iraq and making the pointed difference 
between disarming Iraq and changing its political régime as two completely 
distinct objectives, the first apparently acceptable to him, the second not, 
even if Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and former aggressions against Iran, 
Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Israel between 1980 and 1991 had to be taken 
into account as well as internal repression of Kurdish and Shiite popula- 
tions with the use of poison gas, was a loss of international stature even 
inside Europe. While the German government was neither isolated nor ex-
cluded from the councils of the alliance, it lost all influence in Washington 
and consequently on decisions by major allies on dealing with Iraq. In fact, 
Schröders stance, which his coalition partner and foreign mi- nister Fischer 
had shared at first (and even secretly agreed to before the start of the diffi-
cult election campaign), resulted in – at least temporary – marginalization 
of Germany for the conduct of alliance policy on international security and 
crisis management. Artificial German self-constraints were not new to 
Nato, the US and the EU partners. But never before had they been so arbi-
trary, so unnecessary, so offensive to the leading power of the alliance and 
the world, so risky in terms of Germany’s own security and international 
influence on Western crisis control strategies and hence so self-defeating 
for Germany and its government. 
This effect was clearly shown immedeately in the fall of 2002 on five ma-
jor fronts of international politics with particular German interests and pro-
blems: The UN conflict resolution policies, EU & Nato enlargening, the 
new US security strategy and Nato, relations with Israel and with Turkey. 
For the time being, Germany is neither attractive to Eastern Europe and the 
future new members of Nato and the EU, let alone considered as the „cen-
tral power of Europe“, capable of integrating these countries into the Euro-
pean communities and the alliance nor to coalition-building at the UN. As a 
member of the UN Security Council in 2003 Germany had to put itself 
forward with an active policy, to stand up and be counted as the other 
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members during this critical year in international politics between peace 
and war in discussions on demands and resolutions, in the vote on decisions 
and for the commitment of resources to act as well as for military participa-
tion if deman-ded by the secretary general of the UN to carry out and im-
pose decisions for „world peace and international security“. In this respect 
the Schröder governments self-constraint not to participate with military 
force in any intervention against Iraq even with a UN mandate or UN de-
mand on Germany was particularly counter-productive for the German na-
tional interest. The East European candidates for Nato membership always 
looked west beyond Germany and across the Atlantic to America, but as 
long as Germany, their most important neighbour to the West was a strong 
and respected American ally, Berlin was considered the gate to „Atlantic 
Europe“ and to the EU as well. Germany still is the anchor of US military 
presence on the continent of Europe and one of the most important coun-
tries of the EU. But the end of the East-West conflict has reduced Ger-
many’s strategic key position in the central area of military confrontation 
and enhanced the strategic importance of Britain, Italy in the Mediterranean 
and Turkey, now in pivotal key position between the Southern part of East-
ern Europe with Ukraine, Russia, the Black Sea and the Caucasus, since 
1992 open to access from the West via Turkey, not only as the corner stone 
on the South-Eas-tern flank of Europe and Nato, central to security in the 
Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East between the Le-
vant, the Caucasus and the Gulf, as one of Clin-ton’s chief negotiators, 
Deputy Under Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke said in 1994: „One of 
the two strategic allies of the US in Europe and on all three fronts Balkans, 
Cau- casus and Gulf“ (the other being Germany). September 11, 2001 rein-
forced the geopolitical-strategic importance of Turkey for the US and all 
US military operations in the wider region. In the fight against terror, Tur-
key has another key role as the only Muslim country with a secular democ-
racy, however imperfect, a privileged position as former Great Power of 
Europe in Ottoman times over almoast five hundred years with firm links 
to the Orient and since Kemal’s day a resolute Western orientation with 
growing influence of the Ame-rican-European civilisation on the political, 
economic and cultural evolution in Anatolia. The US has supported the 
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Turkish claim to be part of Europe from the very beginning of the euro-
atlantic alliance with Turkish participation since 1952 as a bilateral ally and 
client of American power. The Clinton administration tried to promote 
Turkey’s admission to the EC/EU and the Bush administration has fol-
lowed this exemple in the American interest. 
The EU members have come under American pressure to open Turkey a 
perspective of entry into the EU beyond the customs union and the „strate-
gic partnership“ with the EU, offered several times by Germany since the 
mid-1990ies, an offer underlined onla in 2001/02 by foreign minister 
Fischer. It is however, far from clear where the German interest lies on this 
issue and how it could best be served, i.e. what policy on Turkey Berlin 
should adopt and try to make acceptable by the EU governments. In 2002 
the German government came under massive US pressure to make itself the 
advocate of Turkey’s early admission to the EU. This and the recognition 
that the EU needs Turkey for the implementation of its ESDP in crisis con-
tingencies both as a Nato ally for its consent to use Natro assets independ-
ently and as a central geostrategic position around which some 8o p.c. of 
the defined contingencies for deployment and employment of EU criris re-
action forces revolve, would seem to be the compelling reasons for the 
change of the German attitude towards Turkey’s demand to accede to the 
EU in the coming years, while there are reasons in favour and reasons 
against. These reasons should be debated first in open consultations 
amongst the EU partners without external pressures and the pressure of 
time. For Berlin in late 2002, the Franco-German proposal to the Copenha-
gen EC on EU enlargening with regard to of Turkey, to start negotiations 
with Ankara by 2005, was the only way out of a political predicament, 
which Schröder and Fischer had deepened during the last months. 
The Chancellor’s cautious and even skeptical attitude in Copenhagen in 
december as to the perspective of an admission of Turkey in the years after 
2005 and his mentioning of the issue of Turkish immigration as being of 
critical importance to the EU, showed the depth of the dilemma, that had 
been created long before his time and that Germany could not escape from, 
unless it were covered by its European partners with American understand-
ing for German requirements as to limitations of free movement of persons 
  43Lothar Rühl 
between Turkey and Europe - Germany with its already large Turkish 
community being the prime aim of Turkish migration to Europe.  
More pressing was the short term concern about military assistance to Is-
rael by making arms available for its defence: American „Patriot“ anti-air 
missiles with a limited anti-missile capability, two modern German 
conventional submarines to be built in co-operation by Israel, light 
armoured personnel carriers for the Israeli infantry. While there never was 
a way around the US „Patriot“ systems in the German stores to be delivered 
to Israel on demand, whatever German policy and the state of US-German 
relations, after Schröder’s electoral éclat with the incrimination of US crisis 
policy vis-a-vis Iraq and Saddam Hussein as „adventure“, the German gov-
ernment did not even have much time to bow to the Ame-rican/Israeli de-
mand. Chancellor Schröder had to modify his government’s position on 
this issue as he did on the German „Fuchs“ light armoured vehicles for 
ABC discovery in Kuwait.  
The most critical development was on the central issue of war and peace, 
Schröder had so adamantly posed to the German people instead of to the 
American president, in order to exercise influence on US policy and strat-
egy. It was French diplomacy in New York and Washington which ob-
tained the American concessions on the phrasing of UN SC resolution 1441 
on the inspections of Iraq and the consequences to be envisaged in case of 
non-cooperation by Bagdad or non-compliance of international agreements 
such as the NPT and the other treaties on bans for C and B MMD or the 
UN armistice conditions of 1991 after 16 UN resolutions which Bagdad 
ignored. German influence was marginal at best in the UN since Germany 
was not a member of the SC in 2002 and it was close to zero in Washington 
on how to deal with Iraq. This would change at the UN in january 2003 
when Germany took a seat in the SC. But rarely ever since the Gulf war in 
1991 did the five per-manent members weigh heavier on the scales of deci-
sions. Germany would have to accom-modate not only the US but also 
Britain and France, Russia and China without the former assured close rela-
tions with the US and American support for German initiatives.  
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The new US National Security Strategy with its concept of „pre-emptive 
prevention“ and military „counterproliferation“ by armed intervention and 
coercive-punitive use of force, in sum by „anticipatory“ responses to 
threats, including with nuclear arms to deter or punish the use of chemical 
or biological MMDs agajnst the US or US forces, bases or allies, and wide-
ly ranging mobile forward defence of America overseas, in case of urgency 
by „offensive defence“ (Bush), poses a challenge and a whole set of politi-
cal problems to the European as to the Ortiental allies of the US. The 
creation of a multilateral crisis response force in Nato with US partici-
pation, to be used in operations with US forces under US command & con-
trol for common purposes and interests, is another political and military-
finan-cial challenge to all European allies, i.p. to Germany with its many 
qualifications for active participation in the employment of the force and 
crisis intervention (the German naval units deployed in operation „Endur-
ing Freedom“ east of Africa and in the Arabian Sea are not allowed by Ber-
lin to engage or seize foreign ships and in general to use their arms to coer-
ce). On both major issues, strategy and joint operations in crisis response 
wirth US forces, Germany needs to bring its weight to bear. The conse-
quences of September 11, 2001 show why, also why the German influence 
has been reduced and how it could be built again. 
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The future of EMP security cooperation 
Political and security co-operation within the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship is currently experiencing near-paralysis due to the collapse of the 
Middle East Peace Process. Back in November 1995, when the Barcelona 
Declaration was signed, hopes for a successful peace process were running 
high. The September 1995 handshake between Yasser Arafat and Isaac 
Rabin was still considered a history-making image, over which the dark 
shadow of the Israeli prime-minister’s assassination had not yet been cast. 
True, it had been decided from the outset that the Middle East peace proc-
ess would be outside the scope of Barcelona’s first basket, primarily be-
cause it was the affair of the Americans. The United States did not seek or 
want Europe’s involvement in bringing about peace to the region, nor did 
the European Union seek to even remotely involve the US in its Barcelona 
endeavour, which was to remain strictly a Euro-Mediterranean preserve. 
The deterioration of the currently defunct peace process, however, which in 
fact began with the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish extremist, and the 
advent of Netanyahu’s government increasingly contaminated the political 
and security dialogue within the EMP.  
Devising and implementing confidence-building measures, or even partner-
ship-building measures as they were later to be termed, became an impos-
sible task. Aside from the EuroMeSCo network and the training seminars 
organised by the Maltese Academy of Diplomatic Studies, the list of func-
tioning confidence-building measures in the political-security arena is lim-
ited to the Egyptian-Italian initiative on sea rescue. The long and arduous 
negotiations in 1998-2000 in order to draft a Euro-Mediterranean Charter 
on Peace and Stability came to no successful conclusion. Even if the 
French Presidency spared no effort towards that end, the Charter was not The future of EMP security cooperation 
endorsed by the Marseilles Ministerial and is still pending approval. It will 
most certainly not be adopted in the near future except in the unlikely event 
of fresh hopes for peace in the Middle East. Without the Charter being 
adopted, there is little hope for any kind of meaningful multilateral security 
co-operation to be developed outside the framework of CFSP or ESDP be-
tween the Union and its Mediterranean partners.  
In order to overcome the current stalling in the political and security basket, 
and avert frustration and fatigue created by a succession of meetings where 
dialogue is at times notoriously absent and which are leading nowhere, it 
has been suggested that all hard security issues should simply be aban-
doned. Efforts should be placed on soft security co-operation instead, and 
especially in establishing a free trade area, as originally intended. It is per-
haps useful to revisit the Barcelona Declaration in light of its original stated 
aim – to create a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability, democ-
racy and shared prosperity. What is, in other words, the road to peace in the 
Middle East and the Maghreb enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration? The 
answer to these fundamental questions will largely determine the role and 
the relative importance of security co-operation within the EMP.  
The Barcelona Process is a North/South integration project that aims to 
achieve peace and security based on principles of democracy and inclu-
siveness. This means expanding southwards the European area of ‘peace 
and prosperity’ through a process of inclusion, which falls short of integra-
tion proper and relies chiefly on the establishment of a free-trade area, 
through a set of association agreements with the European Union as a first 
stage. The agreements provide for financial assistance tied to political con-
ditionality. Therefore, it is necessarily a long-term initiative, especially 
when observing the stalled progress in establishing the rule of law, democ-
racy and fundamental rights in southern countries. It is a comparable proc-
ess to the one developed towards the future candidate-members of the 
European Union in the nineties. 
In reality, EMP security cooperation is not essential to meet these goals. One 
has only to think that where pre-accession co-operation agreements with 
Central and Eastern Europe were concerned, political and security co-
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operation was given the lowest priority. The level of political and security 
co-operation will certainly be a measure of the progress and ultimate suc-
cess of a Euro-Mediterranean grouping, but it is questionable whether it is 
one of the main conditions to bring it about. In other words, political con-
vergence is a necessity if a Euro-Mediterranean grouping is ever to emerge, 
and the degree of political and particularly security cooperation at the mul-
tilateral level shall reflect progress achieved overall. At this stage, however, 
the fundamental aim, and the bulk of efforts, should concentrate on 
translating into reality the political, economic and social goals enunciated 
in Barcelona, bearing in mind that a comprehensive approach remains 
crucial towards that end. Clearly, the resolution of differences and conflicts 
that impede co-operation between partners and thus the fulfilment of the 
Partnership’s objective is essential. This is notably the case of the Western 
Sahara, and more so the state of war between Israel and Palestine, without 
which regional co-operation in the Maghreb or the Middle East is incon-
ceivable. Efforts towards the resolution of these differences and conflicts 
should certainly be vigorously pursued in parallel by EMP members through 
other fora of which they form part. 
In order to keep the Barcelona security dialogue alive, attempts at resolving 
or managing crises should be abandoned. Instead, the dialogue should con-
centrate on the development of a shared vision of security which character-
ises a regional process such as the EMP, which is implied by a process of 
inclusion founded on the deligitimation of nationalism especially in its 
radical or extreme variants. Should such a vision be adopted, it would be-
come self-evident that confidence-building measures among southern part-
ners are far more important than North-South ones. 
As far as hard security is concerned, however, the EMP is clearly not the 
appropriate forum for co-operation at this stage. It is inadequate either to 
promote defence co-operation, or to resolve the current serious crises 
across the Mediterranean. The fact remains however that Barcelona can 
make no real progress in the absence of a satisfactory outcome for these 
crises, and the European Union will strive to ensure a strong commitment 
to their resolution on the part of the international community. Most impor-
tantly, the fact that hard security co-operation is not feasible at 27, at the 
  48  The future of EMP security cooperation 
multilateral level, does in no may mean it cannot be developed by the Eu-
ropean Union proper, either multi/bilaterally or with groups of willing and 
able southern partners, within the framework of CFSP/ESDP. This is one of 
the policy options strongly suggested in the report on A European Strategic 
Concept for the Mediterranean, in line with findings of a EuroMeSCo 
report on the impact of ESDP. The latter concluded that ESDP “has not gen-
erated adverse reactions in the Mediterranean and, in some instances, has 
even raised hopes that the European Union would take on a more active 
and decisive role on the world scene.” 
The European Union should therefore seek to develop “variable geometry” 
security and defence co-operation in conjunction with its southern partners. 
Measures or actions would not necessarily involve all Fifteen, and some 
thought should be given to what use smaller groupings such as the Fi-
ve+Five or the Mediterranean Forum could be put in this respect, as well as 
bilateral defence agreements between European Union and Southern EMP 
members. There is a stark contrast indeed between the reality of internal 
and external security co-operation among individual EMP partners across 
the Mediterranean, and the difficulties currently experienced at the multi-
lateral EMP level in this field.  
Shared vision and common language 
Though it should not lose its long-term ambition of decisively contributing 
to resolving crises across the Mediterranean, the EMP political and security 
dialogue should concentrate on producing a shared vision of security and a 
common language, as well as devising measures to foster mutual trust. At 
the current stage, this kind of exercise remains the best hope for the EMP to 
weigh decisively on the realm of security and the best hope for re-
launching the security debate within the Partnership. Seeking to develop a 
common definition of its content and of the main issues which form part of 
it. Furthermore, this is indeed a necessary exercise to consolidate a future 
regional Euro-Mediterranean regional group.  
Common definitions are also a precondition to ensure the Process remains 
coherent, and a virtuous inter-linkage between all three baskets is achieved, 
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as opposed to a mutually-defeating rationale. Again, it should be borne in 
mind that the principles of democratic inclusion are reflected in the Barce-
lona Declaration. The declared aims of the Partnership are that peace and 
security should be achieved through an integrated or comprehensive ap-
proach. This is, indeed, the principle inherent in all three EMP baskets since 
they should integrate with each other, thus making the Barcelona Process 
itself viable. It is apparent that progress including in the creation of a free 
trade area is conditional to political convergence as far as the rule of law 
and human rights are concerned. There will be no trade, let alone free or 
fair, if the neighbour remains the enemy. On the other hand, the direct link 
between the rule of law & accountability and economic development is far 
greater than it is often appreciated. A recent report on Portugal, for exam-
ple, suggests a reform of the judicial system would bolster growth by 0.6 
per cent of GDP. 
Seeking a shared vision of security is all the more important since the post-
11 September international environment has prompted all-encompassing 
notions of security, or in other words a pervasive security-driven approach 
which has fatally blurred the distinction between domestic and external se-
curity concerns. This is a particularly worrying trend in societies experienc-
ing political transition, and can seriously hinder or impede the reform proc-
ess. The fact that the Bush administration sees terrorism as the overriding 
threat that shapes the whole international security agenda has allowed some 
states to justify their own strategies in similar terms. Such an approach is 
having a devastating effect on state policies in societies that face terrorist 
activities and in those states where Islamist political forces are excluded 
from the political process. The reason for this is that such approaches are 
used to justify repressive strategies and, in some cases, to reinforce authori-
tarian practices.  
The debate on the concept of comprehensive security thus gains renewed 
importance, and should thus be viewed as central in the quest for common 
definitions within the EMP. This is especially the case since divergences in 
respect to the rule of law have widened within the EMP, and this aspect is 
fundamental not only to the protection of human rights but also, as high-
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lighted above, for the very feasibility of a free trade area which can attract 
investment. 
In the context of EuroMeSCo, a number of policy recommendations hae 
been made in this regard, in order to prevent that the pursuit of peace and 
stability as the ultimate goal to which everything should be subordinate 
could result in the opposite outcome. I would like to stress the following: 
A clarification of the meaning of a comprehensive security concept is nec-
essary, for it is plain that “comprehensive” or “integrated” security does not 
mean the same thing to people from different security cultures, and can be 
understood as an authoritarian-driven, “total-security” notion. Thus, the 
term security itself must be restricted to issues that imply the use of force. 
In order to indicate the comprehensive nature of the Process, i.e. the need 
for the approach to its three “pillars” and the policies they generate to re-
main coherent, thus making individual contributions to the overall objec-
tive of peace and stability, the term comprehensive approach or compre-
hensive policy should be preferred. Integrated or comprehensive policies 
must make a clear linkage between security, democratisation and economic 
development – as well as between the latter two concepts as mutually rein-
forcing sides of the same coin.  
All internal security issues, including anti-terrorism measures, must be 
strictly linked to co-operation over issues of justice, fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Migration must be separated from security altogether.  
The role of civil society should be reinforced as a vital element to generate 
mutual trust and to ensure good governance within a comprehensive policy. 
It is both possible and desirable to seek a EMP-wide conceptual definition 
on which a common language can be built. This exercise has already been 
launched as far as the definition of terrorism is concerned, which is cur-
rently the main issue, bearing in mind the difference between “national” 
and “international” terrorism, as well as the need for a vehement condem-
nation of all kinds of violence against civilians. 
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After September 11, is there a future for 
the Barcelona Process? 
After September 11 is there a future for the Barcelona process? The ques-
tion is put in order to make understand that September 11 is a fateful date 
for the Process as besides for all the globe. The question is very suggestive 
in the sense that it affirms that the process doesn't escape effects of Sep-
tember 11 and challenges us on the reach of these effects. 
Indeed There is no doubt that events of September 11 mark this beginning 
of this century and will mark the world for again a very long time. 
I would not stop on these events nor on their fallouts on the world, it is not 
our subject, but what it would be interesting to analyse that is to know if 
the Barcelona process suffers as many effects of events of September 11 as 
of other factors that block its advanced and that exist already long before 
this date. 
Indeed, the Barcelona process has been thought and has been conceived 
like a process whose goal was to create a certain homogeneity in a geo-
graphical space considered how often contradictory and in which the in-
comprehension reigned between these residents. The Barcelona process is 
wanted as the most coherent tentative to promote a global politics aiming to 
establish "a zone of dialogue, exchange and co-operation that guaranteed 
the peace, the stability and the shared prosperity in Mediterranean". These 
objectives reflect the different problematic that knows the Mediterranean, 
and the Barcelona project is going to try to look for the coherent answers to 
these problematic. The three baskets of the partnership testify some of the 
global character assigned to this process; a globality whose final objective Ahmed Driss 
remains the stability in the Mediterranean. However this one depend essen-
tially and in large left of socio-economic factors and politics that the proc-
ess, in spite of the ambition of these inventors, don't manage to contain. 
The economic difficulties that touch countries of the south, the demo-
graphic structure as well as the differential crescent of the standard of liv-
ing between the north and the south of the Mediterranean constitute sources 
of destabilisation at present insoluble. 
A long time therefore before events of September 11 the Barcelona process 
was the subject of numerous critical. On the financial plan and in general 
manner, if the whole of credits programmed to the title of MEDA has been 
hired well, the rate of payment remained very weak since it doesn't only 
pass the 26% of engagements. 
But it is especially the first basket of the partnership (politics and security) 
that didn't know hardly of advanced and that remained blocked to the initial 
stadium. 
The advanced in this basket remain tributaries of destabilization factors es-
sentially bound to the conflict in the Middle East, and it is important to re-
mind in this respect that the Barcelona process has been launched in a re-
gional and international context in which all indicated that odds of stabili-
zation of the Middle East are well real. Barcelona came to come with the 
Israeli-Arabic peace Process, launched to Madrid in 1991, confirmed there-
after by the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Agreements. The peace seemed com-
mitted on an irreversible way. A specialist of the Middle East wrote that the 
peace had to assure the takeoff of the euro-Mediterranean partnership pro-
ject thus and even to drag him in the wake of the results gotten.  
Premises of the stabilization of the region permitted the emergence of a 
process that wanted himself global therefore, but as independent of the 
peace process. Partners wanted to separate thus the two processes in order 
to optimize odds (chance) of the partnership. But although the direct actors 
to the conflict have all the time separated the possibility to use the setting 
of Barcelona like a subsidiary setting, it didn't prevent interference between 
the two processes, giving back, especially Barcelona the hostage of the 
peace process. the second Intifada that explodes in September 2000 re-
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duced to nothing all hopes bound (linked) to this process and block all ad-
vanced in the euro-Mediterranean partnership. Events of September 11 
come to give the stroke of grace. 
Europe had opted just as the process of peace was launched, to privilege 
the American sponsorship and it doesn't have not to antagonize his efforts, 
no opted more to make of the process of Barcelona a setting of relay for 
possible talks if the first process comes to be stopped; what makes that after 
September 11 the European union found again resourceless and incapable 
to take the relief on an actor (US) too occupied by his " new cold war", the 
engagement of the United States in their war against terrorism dismiss the 
Middle East conflict of priorities of the hour. 
Already before September 11 the President Bush had announced his inten-
tion to disengage himself of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, events of Sep-
tember 11 rather contributed to hardening American position vis-à-vis the 
Palestinian claiming, and a total alignment on the Israeli positions. A paral-
lel is established quickly between the international terrorism and Palestin-
ian attempt-suicide authors, an Israeli-American almost-fusion in only one 
strategic entity (the two States considered themselves as the privileged tar-
gets of islamiste terrorism ") what contributes to affirm that September 11 
opened a new era in the international relations that was never as favourable 
to the security interests of Israel, and also to confirm that the whole of the 
international community, put aside the United States, and that tempts in 
vain to promote a political exit to the crisis, remainder incapable to make 
bend the American positions or, to be able to make pressure on the Israeli 
government. 
Initiatives that come tempt to make its initial dimension bring back the con-
flict on all sides and whose resolution raises the international right. 
It is this situation that therefore, contaminate the Barcelona process and 
paralyses it. Partners of the south of the Mediterranean blame their Euro-
pean partner his lack of engagement in charge in the hold of his responsi-
bilities in the management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the question 
who puts himself is the one to know if he is capable, if he has the necessary 
means? it is clear that no.  
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But that Europe is capable or no to take his responsibility in this conflict, 
his erasing facing the American actor demonstrates, that one of baskets of 
Barcelona remains unworkable to the less. All the more reason that this 
erasing is not quite neutral, since Europe often shares with the United 
States and Israel their definition of terrorism, which is a general definition 
that separates all distinction between terrorism and act of resistance when it 
is about liberation struggle against the colonization. 
This absence of bringing together in the perception of certain concept be-
tween residents of the north and the south of the Mediterranean, contribute 
to the blockage of the process also. After September 11, the gap in the per-
ception of these concepts is enlarges. A certain phobia seize of the north-
Mediterranean, some considered that the geographical proximity with 
North Africa and the Medal-East, added to the fact that Europe " shelters an 
important Moslem minority, susceptible to the confusion of this region " 
giving back Europe more vulnerable to the terrorist threats, and it is there-
fore in his own interest that she should affirm his solidarity with the anti-
terrorist struggle of the United States ". September 11 would contribute to 
encourage an anti-terrorist alliance that would come to substitute itself to 
the euro-Mediterranean Partnership and it is nearly impossible to join the 
two, because it is unbearable that Europe comes to propose to his southern 
neighbours, a setting of peace of stability and common security and in the 
same time to align on positions of the United States in the research of a 
new global enemy. And it is just as incompatible to propose the institution 
of a free exchange zone in Mediterranean and to continue to close of a very 
hermetic way his borders to all human exchange with the south. The recent 
positions of a certain number of European countries vis-à-vis the crisis with 
Iraq, let get settled the hope to see Europe departing of the American as-
cendancy. 
But the all first emergency it is to see Europe taking the initiative to throw 
back a dynamics of peace in the Middle East, Europe will be able to con-
tribute to the stake there of a protective international strength of the Pales-
tinian civil populations, she can also make pressure on the Israeli govern-
ment while suspending the agreement of association, of which a certain 
number of terms is raped by Israel. 
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It is certain, at the present hour, and as recalled it the former French foreign 
-minister, H. VEDRINE, at the last annual conference of EUROMESCO ( 
Paris February 2002) that it is not more possible to work usefully in an as 
global setting which is " Barcelona ". The idea that is currently extensively 
shared that is that it would be necessary to introduce a certain suppleness to 
allow the particular regions of the Mediterranean to advance better than of 
others.  
"Barcelona" could survive if he is not anymore the hostage of the problem 
who has the more to regress following events of September 11: the Middle 
East. 
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Future Challenges from the Mediterra-
nean for German Foreign Policy: An 
Economic Perspective 
The aim of the EU Mediterranean policy is the creation of a region of 
peace, stability and prosperity. There are challenges of different type 
threatening the attainment of these goals, which are shared by the German 
foreign policy, now and in the foreseeable future. They include the ongoing 
or even escalating violent conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and 
the possibility of an external US military intervention in Iraq. Besides these 
evident challenges a large number of less obvious challenges do exist, and 
this paper shall highlight three of them which have an economic dimension.  
Economic problems of Mediterranean countries as such are not a challenge 
to the German foreign policy, but they can become a challenge when they 
put the political stability in the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) at 
risk or when they induce serious adverse effects in the EU such as uncon-
trolled migration or illegal trade practices. Economic problems of MPCs 
should also be considered a challenge for the German foreign policy if they 
are aggravated or even caused by policies of the EU.  
1. Continuity in Substandard Regional Economic Per-
formance 
The economies of most MPCs are presently in a bad shape (or even in a 
deep crisis as, for example, Turkey) which can partially be attributed to the 
effects of September 11. However, economic problems are by no means Future Challenges from the Mediterranean for German Foreign Policy 
new phenomena in the region. The Arab Human Development Report 2002 
paints a rather gloomy picture of the substandard long term achievements 
of the Arab word.
1 Although it is undeniable that Arab countries have pro-
gressed in some fields of human development which resulted, for example, 
in an increase of the life expectancy of men and women. However, the 
overall results are rather disappointing given the region's richness in natural 
resources. Compared with its vast potentials, the Arab world was underper-
forming during the last decades. Its relative position in the 'economic world 
league' tends to deteriorate further in coming years because the process of 
development has gained much more momentum in most other parts of the 
world. Following are just a few trends which cause concern:
2 
Over the last 20 years the average annual growth rates of the per capita in-
come in the Arab world was a meagre 0.5%; no region in the world except 
sub-Saharan Africa performed worse.  
There is a widening productivity gap to the disadvantage of the Arab 
world: While the total factor productivity declined in the Arab region since 
the 1960s, it increased in the rest of the world (and particularly in South-
East Asia). The labour productivity improved in the Arab world in absolute 
terms, but in spite of this, the relative position deteriorated because of a 
much faster increase in the rest of the world. 
Unemployment in general and youth unemployment in particular is very 
high in most MPCs. This leads to a pressure on real wages or even a 
downward trend in several Arab countries. 
Further problems "comprise, inter alia, high illiteracy rates, the deteriora-
tion of education, the slow-down of scientific research and technological 
development, poor production bases and competitive capacity, rampant 
 
1  UNDP 2002. The Arab Human Development Report covers the 22 member 
states of the Arab League. Thus its regional coverage is not identical with the 
group of MPCs, but there is a considerable overlap and the general observations 
of the report are of relevance for most MPCs.  
2  A collection of key economic indicators (from the World Bank database "World 
Development Indicators Online", downloaded December, 2002) can be fond in 
the appendix below. 
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poverty and mounting unemployment rates."
3 In its press release, UNDP 
draws the conclusion: "It is evident that in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms, Arab countries have not developed as quickly or as fully as other 
comparable regions. From a human development perspective, the state of 
human development in the Arab world is a cause for concern."
4 
Another recent report of the FEMISE Network is more precisely focussed 
on the MPCs,
 5 and it also does not arouse any enthusiasm regarding the 
economic prospects of the Southern Mediterranean.
6  
The low labour productivity and the worsening of the positions of MPCs in 
the international competition are confirmed. Further the wide (and possibly 
even widening) gap between that growth rate which is needed to absorb the 
growing labour supply and the actual growth rate of MPCs is highlighted.
7 
The need of (much) more technological progress, training and innovation is 
stressed. 
MPCs suffered from consecutive droughts over more than a decade. A bet-
ter access to the European markets is an issue of high priority for Euro-Med 
negotiations. 
There was a modest progress with respect to the dismantling of very high 
trade barriers. "Yet, this trend was .. slower than in other regions during the 
last decade, so that MPC have one of the most protected regions in the 
 
3  UNDP 2002, p. V. 
4  UNDP 2002a.  
5 FEMISE  2002. 
6  Numerous analyses of economic problems and perspectives of the Mediterra-
nean resp. Middle Eastern region and individual countries can be found in the 
internet documentations of the Mediterranean Development Forum organized by 
the World Bank in 1997 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/mdf/mdf1/index.htm), 1998 
(www.worldbank.org/wbi/mdf/mdf2/index.htm), 2000 
(www.worldbank.org/wbi/mdf/mdf3 /index.html) and 2002 
(www.worldbank.org/wbi/mdf/mdf4/index.html). Additional material and 
publications are provided by the Economic Research Forum 
(http://www.erf.org.eg/) and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies 
(www.eces.org.eg/), both located in Cairo. Further, the websites of the Euro-
Mediterranean Study  Commission (EuroMeSCo, 
http://www.euromesco.org/euromesco/matriz.asp)and the FEMISE Network 
and further links.   provide data, studies  7  FEMISE 2002, p. 9. 
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world today."
8 The (unweighted) average tariff rate for 1997-1999 was 
12.4% for all developing countries, but it was more than 20% for Algeria 
(24%), Egypt (20%), Morocco (22%) and Tunisia (30%).
9 In addition, all 
countries apply non-tariff barriers of various types. 
Various free trade agreements among MPCs have reduced or even elimi-
nated trade barriers within the region, but in spite of this liberalization the 
intra-regional trade remained as marginal as before (around 5%)  
The MPCs are no attractive locations for foreign direct investment (FDI) – 
neither from Europe nor from the rest of the world. In some years FDI ac-
count for impressive growth rates, but from a very low starting point (and 
with numerically less impressive but nevertheless sharp downswings in 
other years). The share in global FDI is well below 1%, and in the early 
2000s it is even below the level of the early 1990s. The share of MPCs in 
the FDI of the EU (including intra-EU FDI) fluctuates somewhat around 
1.5% with no clear trend since the middle of the 1990s, i.e. since the begin-
ning of the Barcelona process. Against this background it requires quite 
some optimism to believe that the necessary modernisation of the industries 
of the MPCs will be facilitated by a large inflow of FDI. It has to be recog-
nized that the MPC have improved the conditions for FDI and became 
more attractive locations since the late 1990s compared to pervious years. 
But this does not help much because the rest of the world (esp. Latin Amer-
ica in the second half of the 1990s) has made even more progress. 
The dominance of the public sector in manufacturing and finance has been 
reduced in most MPCs, but privatization programmes are not completed 
and public enterprises are still burden (not only) to the budgets in several 
MPCs. Privatization in the South Med region is considered slow by interna-
tional standards. To this day, the public sector still dominates most South 
Med economies, far more than in other low and middle income countries in 
the world."
10 
 
8  FEMISE 2002, p. 27. 
9  FEMISE 2002, p. 28. 
10  FEMISE 2002, pp. 74-75. 
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FEMISE has summarized the major problems of MPCs in a headline: 
"Specialization and competitiveness are not favourable to high growth and 
this increases the vulnerability to shocks".
11 In addition to these economic 
troubles, the political scene of most MPCs is also rich in problems. How-
ever, they cannot be dealt with here.
12 
2. Unemployment, Structural Adjustment and EU Sup-
port 
After the dismantling of the protection against imports from the EU within 
the framework of the Eruo-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone,
13 most of the 
traditional industries in the MPCs and smaller producers as well as ineffi-
cient large state owned enterprises will come under heavy competitive 
pressure from EU suppliers. The owners and managers (but also the em-
ployees) of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and state owned enter-
prises (SOEs) will suffer from a loss of protection rents. If the support of 
these groups is crucial for the political survival of the present regimes, it is 
very hard to believe that governments will abolish all economic rents and 
introduce an open and competition based market economy. It is more plau-
sible to assume that new forms of rent seeking will emerge and new 
sources of rents will be opened up. This will create new distortions and in-
efficiencies in the economies of the MPCs.  
The problem with large scale rent seeking is that it diverts resources from 
welfare enhancing productive uses to welfare distributing efforts and re-
wards 'political' investments instead of productive investments. Further, the 
politico-economic system becomes less transparent and less open and gen-
erates an uneven and unjust distribution of income and wealth. In short, 
rent seeking is an obstacle to economic development. 
If German foreign policy is concerned with economic development in the 
MPCs, it should not support rent seeking strategies. However, it may well 
 
11  FEMISE 2002, p. 40. 
12  A collection of updated political country studies Long, Reich 2002. 
13  For more details and a critical assessment see Nienhaus 1999. 
  62  Future Challenges from the Mediterranean for German Foreign Policy 
be that the support of the EU for the structural adjustment policies in the 
MPCs creates on a large scale new rent seeking opportunities. One has to 
keep in mind that, on the one hand, it is technically very difficult to reach 
the target groups for structural adjustment support, and that, on the other 
hand, there is a basic conceptual problem with respect to EU's efforts to 
improve the competitiveness of MPC firms: A major concern is unem-
ployment induced by the opening of markets to superior competitors. The 
EU offers assistance for the modernisation of MPC firms in preparation for 
the intensified competition. This may benefit the owners of enterprises, but 
hardly the employees: Unemployment could only be prevented if the MPC 
firms can manufacture the same products as their European competitors at 
comparable costs with more labour intensive technologies. This requires 
that efficient technologies of this (labour intensive) type are available and 
that the labour costs per unit are considerably lower in MPCs than in the 
EU. 
It is doubtful whether productivity adjusted labour costs in MPCs are par-
ticularly low – in spite of the recent pressure on real wages: Qualified la-
bour seems to be a scarce and relatively expensive resource in many MPCs. 
Only unqualified labour is cheap, but not as cheap as in several countries of 
Eastern Europe, the former USSR and South Asia. Against this back-
ground, it is hard to identify 'appropriate technologies' to enhance the com-
petitiveness of MPC firms without a substantial reduction of staff. But even 
if such technologies could be identified, it is not obvious why EU firms 
should apply them in MPCs and not invest in countries where labour costs 
are even lower and the growth dynamics higher than in the MPCs. In gen-
eral, it should not be forgotten that the EU bureaucracy cannot enhance the 
competitiveness of the MPCs by itself but only in close cooperation with 
European enterprises as potential investors or partners in value chain net-
works. But for most European enterprises, the creation of the Euro-Med 
Free Trade Zone will change not much with respect to the quality of the 
MPCs as locations for investments: The asymmetric association agree-
ments granted producers of manufactured goods (excluding textiles) lo-
cated in the MPCs a nearly unrestricted access to the European markets 
since many years. Thus, if location advantages would exist, they could 
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have been exploited by European firms in the past already, but not much 
has happened so far. On the contrary: It cannot be ruled out that in the past 
a strong investment motive for some European enterprises was the protec-
tion of the relatively large domestic MPC markets (such as Egypt) which 
will be abandoned when the free trade agreement enters into force.  
In total, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the EU trade policy will cause 
open unemployment. The structural adjustment support can at best mitigate 
the problem but certainly cannot solve it. Increasing and persistent unem-
ployment can create anti-European sentiments, destabilize political regimes 
and induce a migration pressure which was to be prevented by the Mediter-
ranean policy. These are potential future challenges for the EU and for the 
German foreign policy. Germany has specific experiences with persistent 
unemployment and structural adjustment in the New Länder. It should 
know best that market orthodoxy and support of enterprises on the micro-
economic level do not always solve macroeconomic problems. Fresh think-
ing and some unconventional approaches (e.g. for temporary wage subsi-
dies and the installation of adapted social security systems) may be neces-
sary in order to minimize the frictions and reduce political tensions caused 
by the far-reaching structural adjustment needs. 
There is no question that structural adjustment, liberalization and privatiza-
tion are necessary in the long run. What is questioned, however, is the tim-
ing and sequencing as well as the choice of particular instruments. 
3. Crises, Opposition and Reactions of Rentier States 
The economic prospects of the MPCs are, in general, not very bright, and 
in several countries the economic situation can be characterized as a crisis. 
This is not new to the people in the region. Therefore, a poor economic per-
formance or an economic crisis as such is not a real challenge. However, it 
seems that the today's crises gain a different quality:  
There is a growing and accumulating frustration and disappointment. Peo-
ple realize that the rest of the world – including formerly crisis-ridden 
countries in Asia as well as formerly socialist transformation states – is re-
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covering and developing much faster than the South Mediterranean resp. 
Middle East. After failed socialist and statist economic policies, many gov-
ernments have propagated market oriented systems, but the economies did 
not take off as hoped-for after at least a decade of reform rhetoric.  
The stock of unsolved problems is growing. Regional disparities, for ex-
ample between the capital and rural areas or costal regions and arid zones, 
have not been levelled out. On the contrary, market reforms have contrib-
uted to a further polarization of economic activities in the industrial and 
commercial centres without trickle down or spill over effects for the rest of 
the country. Domestic savings are insufficient to finance the productive in-
vestments which are needed for a perceptible improvement of the economic 
situation. Foreign direct investment could bring some relief, but the level of 
inflows into the MPC is very low, and FDI is concentrated on very few 
countries (mainly Israel, Egypt and Turkey) and often concentrated on the 
oil and petrochemical sector. In spite of a reduction of the population 
growth rates over the past years, the high birth rates of the 1980s imply that 
large numbers of young people are looking for jobs today, but their pros-
pects in the labour markets are gloomy. Youth unemployment is estimated 
to be as high as 30% to 50%. 
It gives cause for concern that a growing number of people no longer be-
lieve that the present regimes do have the capacity (or willingness) to solve 
their problems. Once people lose hope of a betterment of their situation, the 
individual 'opportunity cost' of violent resistance and radical protests de-
crease and their probability increases. Such tendencies can be seen in coun-
tries like Algeria or Egypt. The reactions of the regimes may pose a future 
challenge to EU governments.  
In Algeria the military is (still) backing a civil government whose weak 
democratic legitimation has not been strengthened by the recent elections 
due to a very low voter turnout. Growing regional disparities and discrimi-
nation against the Berber population lead to riots which were suppressed by 
security forces.
14 In order to contain the erosion of the living conditions of 
various politically important groups of people, the government spends 
 
14  EIU 2002, PRS 2002. 
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about one third of its budget for subsidies of different kinds (including sub-
sidies of food stuff). Further, ethnic clashes and Islamist terrorism were 
main arguments to slow down reform policies directed towards more com-
petition and openness of the economy. Critical observers note that this fac-
tual termination of the transformation towards a market economy serves in 
particular the economic interests of the security forces which are closely 
intertwined with large (but inefficient) state owned enterprises.
15 It seems 
that under the 'guidance' of the military the rentier structures of the past are 
conserved (resp. modernized). This is neither in a national perspective nor 
with respect to the obligations taken on by the agreement with the EU a 
sustainable policy. None of the pressing problems of the country will be 
solved by the postponement of necessary reforms. 
A similar political strategy in a less violent environment (and with less po-
litical involvement of the security forces) can be seen in Egypt. As long as 
the government was dependent on the financial support of the IMF to over-
come external debt problems, it did follow the recommendations of the 
Bretton Woods institutions regarding macroeconomic stabilization, micro-
economic liberalization and structural adjustment. But earlier this year – 
when Egypt's support of the US 'war against terrorism' paid politically as 
well as financially – the government changed its strategy considerably and 
embarked upon an expansionary macroeconomic policy (with considerable 
wage increases in the public sector, growing social expenditures and in-
creasing subsidies of various types) and slowed down (factually halted) the 
privatization and liberalization programmes.
16 Officially this revision of the 
reform policy was justified with the intention to support the weaker seg-
ments of the society and to shield the population from hardships associated 
with further structural adjustment (esp. increasing unemployment) in a 
situation of economic weakness. Given the present lines of geopolitical 
conflicts, the Egyptian government will hardly be confronted with harsh 
critique from its Western allies – even if they disapprove the suspension or 
partial reversal of market oriented reform policies. It cannot be ruled out 
that statist political forces in Egypt have anticipated such a non-reaction 
 
15  ICG 2000, 2001. 
16  EIU 2002a, Semich 2002. 
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and took advantage of the favourable situation in order to stop the erosion 
of their economic rents or even to make new sources of rents accessible. 
The interruption of transformation processes without a clear perspective for 
the resumption and without verifiable criteria for revisions and modifica-
tions will create a build-up of unsolved problems. The conservation of the 
rent-seeking status quo will definitely not give people the lacking economic 
perspective and hope for a betterment of their living conditions – on the 
contrary, it may add to the frustration of those outside the privileged 
groups. It may well be that the consequence are instability, conflict and 
poverty in the MPCs, i.e. exactly the opposite of what was aspired by the 
Euro-Med policies. Such a result would be one challenge to foreign policy. 
Another challenge will arise once it becomes clear that MPCs are not will-
ing or able to honour their obligations specified in the agreements with the 
EU. 
4. Democracy and Islam-oriented Politics 
It is widely recognized that the political systems of most MPCs are authori-
tarian or autocratic. In recent months, this has become an issue for the Bush 
administration and US media. The idea is that after the toppling of Saddam 
Hussein and a rapid democratization of Iraq, a kind of domino effect could 
seize the whole region and induce democratic transformations all over the 
Middle East. It shall not be discussed here whether this is a realistic vision 
or a dangerous fantasy.
17 Only one aspect shall be highlighted which may 
point to a future challenge for German foreign policy if more democracy is 
realized in Muslim countries: It is highly probable that candidates or parties 
with an Islamic background will win democratic elections and form Islam-
oriented governments in many Muslim countries. The challenge will be 
how to deal with such results.  
After the thwarted case of Algeria, the world is now confronted (for the 
second time in recent years) with a democratically elected Islam-oriented 
government in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an 
 
17  Ottaway, Carothers, Hawthorne, Brumberg 2002. 
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outright victory and swept away the old political establishment. Many out-
side observers no longer believed in any problem solving capacity of the 
old system – characterized by unstable coalition governments for approx. 
15 years, populism, opportunism and widespread corruption within the po-
litical establishment. Thus, a change towards a government backed by a 
clear majority in the parliament was cautiously but widely welcomed.
18 
The head of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was a successful mayor of 
Istanbul and openly declared his belief in Islam. This certainly made him 
popular among Islam-oriented voters. Nevertheless, the election campaign 
of AKP was less 'Islamist' than that of the Felicity Party (SP) which was 
factually controlled by former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan (offi-
cially banned from politics since 1998). Erbakan was part of the old estab-
lishment, and the Islamist SP gained a mere 2.5% of the votes. This sup-
ports the hypothesis that the Turkish people voted mainly in favour of a 
credible new team instead of fundamentalist Islamic ideology.
19 The AKP 
itself, which is one of the two successors of Erbakan's former Virtue Party 
(the other one being SP) which was closed down in June 2001, played 
down its Islamist roots. The new government confirmed its commitment to 
economic reforms along the lines worked out by the former government 
and the IMF, and Erdogan repeatedly declared that his prime goal is the EU 
membership of Turkey. The powerful military who assume the role of 
guardians of the secular state in Turkey, are willing to accept the new gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, they as well as the judiciary remain sceptical be-
cause of the Islamic roots of the AKP and its Islamic orientation. The fu-
ture will show whether this moderated the politics of AKP at least in its 
initial phase. 
Given the instability of the run down old political establishment, the pecu-
liarities of the Turkish situation and the deep economic crisis, the last elec-
tions are not an example for a democratic takeover of political power by an 
 
18  The peculiarity of the present situation (with a destabilizing potential) is that the 
leader of the AKP cannot become prime minister himself due to a court judge-
ment, and that a court case is pending to close down the whole party.  
19 EIU  2002b. 
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Islamist regime. Therefore the outside world articulated cautious optimism 
after the victory of AKP.
20 
But one wonders what the reaction might have been if an Islam-oriented 
party would have gained a similar landslide victory in elections in another 
country whose regime looks more stable, less discredited and pro-Western 
(for example Tunisia or Egypt). A fictitious scenario is this: A transition to 
an Islam-oriented government implies a shift of political power and a 
change of elites. Old rentier networks will be disrupted. This will provoke 
forceful opposition from the established elites whose vested interests are 
attacked.  
Since the established elites are interwoven with and linked to the political 
and business systems of Western countries, their voices and critique of the 
new regime will well be heard in Europe. It is not implausible that a transi-
tion to an Islam-oriented government in an MPC will not only hurt vested 
interests of former elites but also interfere with the interests of political and 
business circles in Western countries. They may amplify the critique in 
Western media. 
Such a critique may find a ready audience since political Islam has a bad 
reputation in the public opinion of Western countries. The theory of the 
clash of civilizations and the strange lifestyle of Muslims in Europe, the 
radical Islamic opposition against secular regimes and terrorism in the 
name of Islam, the inhumane punishments in some Islamic countries and 
the rule of clerics in the Islamic Republic of Iran – all these 'experiences' 
seem to confirm that Islamic systems are the negation of our enlightened 
world view and a threat to progress and development in the Muslim world.  
Thus, one may conclude, Western governments should support the oppo-
nents of Islam-oriented governments and try to restore the conditions be-
fore their takeover as soon as possible. But this may be a very biased and 
short-sighted reaction, probably based on prejudices and ignorance.  
If the previous scenario is not completely unrealistic and if the expectation 
is shared that Islam-oriented parties will gain importance in future democ-
 
20  See as a representative example EIU 2002b. 
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ratic elections, then the challenge for Western foreign policy in general and 
Germany in particular is  
- to become more familiar with political and economic concepts of contem-
porary Islam and to enter into specific dialogs not of religions or cultures 
but of politicians, businessmen and economists, and 
- to correct, if necessary, the image of Islam in the general public as well as 
in some Western governments who show signs of a deep-rooted 'Islamo-
phobia'.  
It can hardly be denied that an economic system claiming compatibility 
with basic rules and norms of Islam will differ from the status quo in most 
MPCs. The main reason is that (the mainstream of) contemporary Islamic 
economic doctrines favours a transparent and open system with competi-
tion and private enterprises as the driving forces and a government limited 
in its power by laws which cannot be changed by the ruling parties at their 
discretion. This is hardly a description of the realities in Muslim countries. 
People in the West may be surprised to learn that many of supposedly 
Western ideals and ideas such as the rule of law and the principles of good 
governance or the concepts of subsidiarity and solidarity can be found in or 
have been incorporated into Islamic doctrines. This is not to deny that there 
are distinct features and differences with respect to the legitimation, justifi-
cation and deduction of principles as well as with respect to concrete regu-
lations and prescriptions in specific cases (especially in the field of banking 
and finance). But it is striking to see how close Islamic models come in 
crucial aspects to the policy recommendations of Western institutions such 
as the IMF for developing countries in general and MPCs in particular. Is-
lamic concepts may have shortcomings with regard to the efficiency of the 
financial sector when compared to secular models of 'perfect' market 
economies. But such a comparison does not do justice to the political and 
developmental potential of Islamic approaches. These potentials become 
visible when Islam-oriented policy designs are assessed against the realities 
of the economic systems of most MPCs. It is possible that Islam-oriented 
policies could achieve those necessary reforms which have been asked for 
since many years by Western institutions but were not consequently im-
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plemented by the established regimes. For many people it makes a substan-
tial difference whether burdensome reforms are introduced by a new Islam-
oriented government of by an old regime:  
Reforms implemented by old regimes are very often pushed by interna-
tional institutions such as the IMF. Thus, they are deemed to be external 
interferences serving mainly the economic interests of the establishment, 
and therefore they face a strong opposition. 
Reforms implemented by Islam-oriented regimes and justified by an Is-
lamic ideology may be seen as 'indigenous' and in the general interest (es-
pecially if there was a change of elites when the Islam-oriented government 
resumed power). An Islamic approach has not been put into action in most 
countries and may be welcomed with great hope and expectations.  
Islamic teachings are somewhat ambivalent with respect to the political or-
der of an Islamic state. They do not exclude democracy as one possible 
form of government, but other types of state such as monarchies can also 
be justified.
21 However, Islamic mainstream is very explicit regarding the 
economic order of an Islamic state: it is a kind of social market economy 
based on private property and open competition (with some special features 
regarding the financial sector and social security).  
The challenges for German foreign policy are, first, to gain a better under-
standing of the peculiarities of Islamic economic systems,
22 and second, to 
enter into a dialogue with Islam-oriented movements which may become 
 
21 Nienhaus  2002. 
22  Islamic finance has attracted the attention of international institutions such as the 
IMF (mainly interested in regulatory and macroeconomic issues, see Errico, 
Farahbaksh 1998, Haque, Mirakhor 1998, Iqbal 1997, Sundararajan, Marston, 
Shabsigh 1998), the World Bank (presenting Islamic project finance techniques 
in several recent conferences in the Arab region, see World Bank Institute 2002) 
and the UNDP (concerning microfinance, see UNDP n.d.), and some British 
university offer degree programs or at least courses in Islamic economics, bank-
ing and finance (Surrey, Loughborrough, Durham). So far no comparable focal 
points do exist in Germany. In order to close this gap, the University of Bochum 
has established a so called Centre of Excellence on "Economics, Islam and De-
velopment" which shall become operational by early 2003: 
http://wipol2.vwp2.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/CoE02-E.htm.  
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strategic partners or allies in the long run – without taking a risk regarding 
the relations with the present regimes.  
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Appendix: Key Economic Indicators 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online da-
tabase 
 
Population, total  
millions) 
1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   25.0  25.6 26.3  26.9  27.5  28.1  28.6  29.0  29.5  30.0  30.4  30.9 
Cyprus   0.7  0.7 0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8 
Egypt, Arab Rep.   52.4  53.6 54.8  55.9  57.1  58.2  59.3  60.4  61.6  62.8  64.0  65.2 
Israel   4.7  4.9 5.1  5.3  5.4  5.5  5.7  5.8  6.0  6.1  6.2  6.4 
Jordan   3.2  3.5 3.7  3.9  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.5  4.6  4.7  4.9  5.0 
Lebanon   3.6  3.7 3.8  3.9  3.9  4.0  4.1  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.3  4.4 
Malta   0.4  0.4 0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Morocco   24.0  24.5 25.0  25.5  25.9  26.4  26.8  27.3  27.8  28.2  28.7  29.2 
Syrian Arab Republic   12.1  12.5 12.9  13.4  13.8  14.2  14.6  15.0  15.4  15.8  16.2  16.6 
Tunisia   8.2  8.3 8.5  8.7  8.8  9.0  9.1  9.2  9.3  9.5  9.6  9.7 
Turkey   56.1  57.0 57.9  58.8  59.7  60.6  61.5  62.5  63.4  64.3  65.3  66.2 
 
 
Population growth 
(annual %)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3  2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6
Cyprus   1.5 1.9 1.9 1.5  1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.5
Egypt, Arab Rep.   2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1  2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Israel   3.1 6.0 3.5 2.7  2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.1
Jordan   3.7 11.2 5.2 4.5  3.9 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9
Lebanon   2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9  1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3
Malta   0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0  1.0 1.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5
Morocco   2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9  1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
Syrian Arab Republic   3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2  3.2 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Tunisia   2.4 2.0 2.0 2.0  1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2
Turkey   2.2 1.6 1.6 1.5  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
 
 
Unemployment, total  
(% of total labor force)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   19.8 20.6 23.0 23.2  24.4 27.9 .. 28.7 .. .. .. ..
Cyprus   1.8 3.0 1.8 2.7  2.7 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.3 .. .. ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   8.6 9.6 9.0 10.9  11.0 11.3 .. 8.4 8.2 .. .. ..
Israel   9.6 10.6 11.2 10.0  7.8 6.9 6.7 7.7 8.5 8.9 8.3 ..
Jordan   .. .. .. ..  .. .. .. 14.4 .. 15.6 13.2 ..
Lebanon   .. .. .. ..  .. .. .. 8.6 .. .. .. ..
Malta   3.9 3.6 4.0 4.5  4.1 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.1 5.3 .. ..
Morocco   15.8 17.3 16.0 15.9  .. 22.9 18.1 16.9 19.1 22.0 .. ..
Syrian Arab Republic   .. 6.8 .. ..  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Tunisia   .. .. .. ..  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey   8.0 7.9 8.1 7.7  8.1 6.9 6.1 6.4 6.4 7.3 8.3 ..
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GDP (constant 1995  
US$, billions)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   41.2 40.7 41.5 40.6 40.2 41.8 43.5 44.0 46.2 47.7 48.8 49.7
Cyprus   7.1 7.2 7.8 7.9 8.4 8.9 9.0 9.3 9.7 10.2 10.6 ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   50.9 51.5 53.7 55.3 57.5 60.2 63.2 66.6 70.4 74.6 78.4 81.0
Israel   64.2 69.2 73.0 77.1 82.5 88.2 92.7 95.7 98.2 100.4 106.4 ..
Jordan   4.8 4.9 5.8 6.1 6.4 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.2
Lebanon   6.3 8.6 9.0 9.7 10.4 11.1 11.6 12.0 12.4 12.5 12.5 12.7
Malta   2.5 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.0 ..
Morocco   31.5 33.7 32.3 32.0 35.3 33.0 37.0 36.2 39.0 39.0 39.3 41.9
Syrian Arab Republic   7.8 8.4 9.5 10.0 10.8 11.4 12.2 12.5 13.5 13.2 13.6 14.1
Tunisia   14.9 15.4 16.7 17.0 17.6 18.0 19.3 20.3 21.3 22.6 23.6 24.9
Turkey   144.6 145.9 154.6 167.1 158.0 169.3 181.2 194.8 200.8 191.4 205.5 192.2
 
 
GDP growth 
(annual %)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   0.8 -1.2 1.8 -2.1 -0.9 3.8 4.1 1.1 5.1 3.2 2.4 1.9
Cyprus   7.4 0.7 9.4 0.7 5.9 6.1 1.9 2.5 5.1 4.5 4.8 ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   5.7 1.1 4.4 2.9 3.9 4.7 5.0 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.1 3.3
Israel   6.8 7.7 5.6 5.6 6.9 7.0 5.0 3.2 2.6 2.2 6.0 ..
Jordan   1.0 1.8 18.8 4.6 5.0 6.4 2.1 3.1 2.9 3.1 4.0 4.2
Lebanon   26.5 38.2 4.5 7.0 8.0 6.5 4.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 0.0 1.3
Malta   6.3 6.3 4.7 4.5 5.8 6.2 4.0 4.8 3.5 4.0 4.7 ..
Morocco   4.0 6.9 -4.0 -1.0 10.4 -6.6 12.2 -2.2 7.7 0.0 0.9 6.5
Syrian Arab Republic   7.6 7.9 13.5 5.2 7.7 5.8 7.3 2.5 7.6 -1.8 2.5 3.5
Tunisia   8.0 3.9 7.8 2.2 3.3 2.3 7.1 5.4 4.8 6.1 4.7 5.4
Turkey   9.3 0.9 6.0 8.0 -5.5 7.2 7.0 7.5 3.1 -4.7 7.4 -6.5
 
 
GDP per capita (constant 
1995 US$, thousands)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Cyprus   10.4 10.3 11.1 11.0 11.5 12.1 12.2 12.4 13.0 13.5 14.1 ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Israel   13.8 14.0 14.3 14.7 15.3 15.9 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.4 17.1 ..
Jordan   1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Lebanon   1.7 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Malta   6.9 7.3 7.5 7.8 8.2 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.5 9.8 10.2 ..
Morocco   1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Syrian Arab Republic   0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Tunisia   1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
Turkey   2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.1 2.9
 
 
 
 
 
GDP per capita growth  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
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(annual %)  
Algeria   -1.8 -3.6 -0.6 -4.4 -3.1 1.7 2.3 -0.6 3.5 1.7 0.9 0.3
Cyprus   5.8 -1.1 7.4 -0.9 4.7 5.2 1.1 1.6 4.4 3.8 4.4 ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   3.3 -1.1 2.2 0.8 1.9 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.6 4.0 3.1 1.4
Israel   3.6 1.4 2.0 2.8 4.2 4.2 2.3 0.7 0.4 -0.2 3.8 ..
Jordan   -2.7 -8.9 12.8 -0.0 1.0 3.0 -1.0 -0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.9 1.2
Lebanon   24.1 35.5 2.5 4.9 6.0 4.5 2.2 2.3 1.4 -0.4 -1.3 -0.0
Malta   5.4 5.4 3.7 3.5 4.7 5.0 3.4 4.0 2.9 3.2 4.2 ..
Morocco   1.9 4.8 -5.9 -2.8 8.4 -8.2 10.3 -3.9 5.9 -1.6 -0.8 4.8
Syrian Arab Republic   4.1 4.4 9.8 1.9 4.3 2.5 4.4 -0.2 4.9 -4.2 -0.0 1.0
Tunisia   5.4 1.9 5.6 0.2 1.4 0.7 5.5 4.0 3.4 4.7 3.5 4.2
Turkey   6.9 -0.7 4.4 6.4 -6.9 5.6 5.4 5.9 1.6 -6.1 5.8 -7.8
 
 
Household final consump-
tion expenditure, etc. (an-
nual % growth)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   -3.5 -7.4 4.8 -2.5 -0.6 2.1 -2.4 -2.2 2.1 3.0 1.7 0.2
Cyprus   9.9 12.2 3.8 -3.0 7.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   7.7 7.5 0.8 5.7 5.1 2.1 4.2 3.5 5.4 3.6 3.9 0.4
Israel   5.2 6.9 9.3 7.7 10.1 7.0 6.2 4.6 3.9 4.0 6.6 ..
Jordan   -9.2 -13.3 28.2 1.5 0.0 -0.6 9.6 4.9 7.2 4.7 11.0 3.0
Lebanon   .. 37.9 3.4 10.2 3.7 4.5 2.7 1.0 -9.2 -0.3 -2.4 7.9
Malta   3.8 3.8 5.1 3.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Morocco   1.7 10.9 -4.1 -2.2 14.6 -5.4 12.4 -4.1 10.6 -1.1 0.1 4.0
Syrian Arab Republic   0.5 -0.1 16.5 1.2 -6.5 7.6 4.2 -0.8 6.2 -3.9 -3.2 3.6
Tunisia   9.0 1.3 6.8 3.3 3.1 3.0 4.4 4.5 5.6 5.8 5.2 4.1
Turkey   13.2 2.5 3.9 8.0 -6.1 5.6 7.9 8.3 0.4 -2.6 6.3 -6.4
 
 
Subsidies and other cur-
rent transfers (% of total 
expenditure)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   .. .. .. .. 27.1 26.4 .. .. 27.1 32.1 .. ..
Cyprus   25.4 25.4 26.3 30.7 30.4 31.6 32.5 32.7 32.8 .. .. ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   26.4 27.5 23.0 24.9 23.9 25.4 15.3 14.9 .. .. .. ..
Israel   37.1 36.8 37.4 37.9 40.9 43.6 44.3 47.3 47.7 48.8 49.3 ..
Jordan   11.1 10.7 10.7 9.6 10.8 10.2 11.3 8.6 9.2 8.2 7.2 ..
Lebanon   .. .. .. 17.9 16.9 16.7 12.5 11.7 11.4 12.2 .. ..
Malta   35.0 33.6 36.9 35.7 35.5 34.2 40.7 41.4 39.8 .. .. ..
Morocco   8.1 8.7 9.4 11.0 12.7 11.6 .. 15.5 15.9 16.3 .. ..
Syrian Arab Republic   .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Tunisia   34.8 32.7 32.5 31.8 31.5 30.7 28.8 28.0 28.2 27.8 25.0 ..
Turkey   16.3 19.0 19.9 28.1 30.7 41.8 46.8 28.9 24.2 24.7 22.4 ..
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Taxes on international 
trade (% of current reve-
nue)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   .. .. .. .. 16.6 18.5 15.5 .. 16.4 14.0 .. ..
Cyprus   15.7 15.6 14.1 10.3 8.5 8.0 7.2 5.6 3.8 .. .. ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   13.8 10.3 10.9 10.0 10.2 10.4 13.1 12.6 .. .. .. ..
Israel   1.7 1.9 1.9 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 ..
Jordan   26.8 29.1 36.4 31.6 29.3 25.3 26.0 22.7 22.9 20.4 19.9 ..
Lebanon   .. .. .. 35.7 35.3 43.5 46.2 46.4 43.7 28.1 .. ..
Malta   23.4 24.2 27.3 25.7 19.6 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.2 .. .. ..
Morocco   17.8 18.4 17.6 16.4 16.5 15.2 .. 15.9 16.2 15.9 .. ..
Syrian Arab Republic   7.4 8.5 10.0 14.1 13.2 12.9 12.4 10.6 11.8 9.9 .. ..
Tunisia   28.1 28.4 29.3 27.9 27.0 27.9 25.7 14.5 13.6 12.1 11.5 ..
Turkey   6.2 5.1 4.5 4.3 3.2 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 ..
 
 
Aid (% of central govern-
ment expenditures)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   .. .. .. .. 3.0 2.4 2.2 .. 2.6 0.6 .. ..
Cyprus   2.1 2.1 1.2 1.6 1.8 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.0 .. .. ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   31.5 44.4 21.9 14.3 13.9 9.9 10.0 8.6 .. .. .. ..
Israel   5.2 7.8 6.5 4.2 3.6 0.8 4.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 ..
Jordan   61.7 59.4 26.7 17.3 19.8 25.7 21.6 19.5 15.5 17.0 21.0 ..
Lebanon   .. .. .. 8.2 7.3 4.8 4.7 3.9 4.3 3.3 .. ..
Malta   0.4 1.9 0.5 2.9 4.0 0.7 5.2 1.6 1.5 .. .. ..
Morocco   14.1 15.9 11.1 7.8 6.4 4.6 .. 4.5 4.8 5.9 .. ..
Syrian Arab Republic   13.1 5.6 2.6 3.0 6.3 2.8 1.6 1.2 0.9 1.3 .. ..
Tunisia   9.2 8.1 7.9 4.7 2.1 1.2 1.9 3.2 2.4 3.8 3.6 ..
Turkey   4.7 5.1 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 ..
 
 
Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows (BoP, current 
US$, millions)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Algeria   0 12 12 15 18 5 4 7 5 7 10 ..
Cyprus   127 82 107 83 75 86 54 76 69 121 160 ..
Egypt, Arab Rep.   734 253 459 493 1,256 598 636 891 1,076 1,065 1,235 ..
Israel   151 346 588 605 442 1,349 1,387 1,628 1,760 2,889 4,392 ..
Jordan   38 -12 41 -34 3 13 16 361 310 158 558 ..
Lebanon   6 0 4 6 7 35 80 150 200 250 298 ..
Malta   46 77 40 56 152 132 277 81 273 815 631 ..
Morocco   165 317 422 491 551 92 76 4 12 3 10 ..
Syrian Arab Republic   71 0 0 109 251 100 89 80 80 91 111 ..
Tunisia   76 126 526 562 432 264 238 339 650 350 752 ..
Turkey   684 810 844 636 608 885 722 805 940 783 982 ..
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Mediterranean Enlargement of the 
European Union: New Challenge for 
Germany 
The historical experience and geographic proximity of the Southern mem-
ber countries of the European Union (EU) enables them to play a key role 
in the Mediterranean region. Northern an Central EU states like Germany 
are all needed and must be involved in the region. 
Mediterranean policy, just like the policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, will 
only succeed if it is considered and accepted as an EU initiative, and not as 
a concern of Southern member states. 
1. Key policy issues of the Mediterranean region 
The Mediterranean region is at the same time a part and a neighbor of 
Europe. Not only geographically but also in economic and security matters, 
the Mediterranean region lies in Europe’s immediate proximity. Trade 
routes that are of central importance to Europe criss-cross the Mediterra-
nean. Energy sources essential to European industry are located in the re-
gion. The Mediterranean countries that are not members of the EU today 
constitute the third largest market of the community. The EU in its turns is 
by far the most important buyer of products from the region. The demo-
graphic growth in the South affects the social and cultural stability of the 
region. The diverse economic, social, political and military conflicts in the 
region have direct repercussions on Europe. Finally, Europe have been al-Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union 
ready affected economically and socially by the high migration potential of 
the region. 
The region is an area of cultural diversity and density. It is where the roots 
of the European and the Arab culture lie. It is where Islam, Christianism 
and Judaism emerged. Thus, the Mediterranean is more than a sea common 
to the countries bordering on it. It is in fact a dense network of a diversity 
of dividing lines between different economic and security systems, differ-
ent political systems and cultures, different languages and religions. 
The Mediterranean is characterized by acute and latent conflicts both 
within the region and between countries. The crucial difficulties of the re-
gion include underdevelopment and the differences in wealth between 
North and South as well as the explosion of the population in the South. 
The consequential problems are a high level of unemployment, a foreign 
trade imbalance and a high level of indebtedness, domestic tensions and 
political instability as well as a generally high potential of violence. 
In the economic level, the region reflects the deepening gap between the 
industrialized world and the developing countries. In terms of its economic 
efficiency, the entire region lags behind the European average. Among the 
countries bordering on the Mediterranean, those in North Africa encounter 
particularly severe problems. Agricultural production is not sufficient to 
feed the population, industrialization is often domestically oriented and un-
successful by market standards, a dependence on financial and technical aid 
from outside exists for all EU’s neighboring countries in the Mediterra-
nean. 
A special situation is created by oil revenues of the states of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region. What is largely lacking in the oil 
states is an industrial mentality as well as awareness of the working value 
of one’s own assets. With the exemption of oil-favored Libya all North Af-
rican states are struggling with their debt burdens. 
Regarding the demographic growth, while the population in the EU coun-
tries is stagnating the number of people in the third Mediterranean coun-
tries is increasing dramatically. Up to the year 2002, the population of the 
EU’s Mediterranean neighbors are expected to grow by 52 million people. 
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At the same time the population of the EU of the fifteen is expected to in-
crease by 3 million people. Based on the demographic development at least 
900,000 new jobs will be required annually on the Southern side of the 
Mediterranean. In comparison, within the EU only 1.8 million new jobs 
will have to be created by year 2003. 
In fact, the countries of the Southern border of the Mediterranean have be-
come exporters of labor. For many people there, emigration is one possibil-
ity of escaping the threat of marginalization at home. The main thrust of 
this migration potential will be in the direction of Europe. Almost 4.5 mil-
lion migrants coming from the Southern Mediterranean already live in the 
EU. 
Concerning the political situation, social tensions and unstable systems of 
government determine the domestic policy situation nearly everywhere in 
Europe. The processes of political decision making are frequently domi-
nated by monopoly or quasi-monopoly parties. The military are of great 
importance in Southern countries of the Mediterranean region as an order 
factor and as a power resource. 
The political development following decolonialization reflects the history 
of failed attempts to copy or transfer Western patterns government and ad-
ministration to the young states. In spite of its collective character and the 
possibility of instrumentalization by authoritarian leaderships the socialist 
model also failed to attain any lasting success. Both models of state ruler 
ship have not succeeded in generating a sufficient measure of domestic and 
social policy consensus. 
In terms of potential of violence, the readiness to use political pressures and 
military force to push through one’s own interests is fed by authoritarian 
political structures, the latent antagonism of the value systems, the exter-
nalization of domestic tensions and considerable level of armaments. The 
respective troop strengths are 2.5 million soldiers in the member states of 
the EU, 2.7 million in the Arab part of the Orient, 450,000 in North African 
states, and 650,000 troops in Turkey. This region was in the 80’s one of the 
main recipient areas of armaments supplies. The Soviet Union mainly sup-
plied weapons to Algeria and Libya running to a total value of some USD 
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3.5 billion while the United States of America supplied Israel and Egypt 
with weapons valued at about USD 6.1 billion and France supplied Egypt 
with USD 0.67 billion worth of armaments. The arms are continuously re-
ceives fresh momentum from the permanent conflicts in the region 
(Greece-Turkey, Israel-Middle East, Maghreb). The ability to produce or 
have access to ABC weapons does exist among the Southern neighbors of 
the EU as Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria and possibly Libya. The military doc-
trines in place do not provide for the use of these military capabilities 
against Europe. Yet, the military potential in the region is a danger to secu-
rity in Europe; limited and predictable military force used against European 
targets under crisis conditions cannot be ruled in the future. On the other 
side, armed conflicts within the region will at any rate also have repercus-
sions on Europe an European interests. 
The specific causes of crises and wars in the region include, beyond con-
flicts of dominance, ethnic conflicts and territorial conflicts, the uneven 
distribution of raw materials or raw material revenues. The border conflicts 
in the Near East possesses an economic dimension; the exploitation of re-
sources under the bottom of the sea, the unimpeded access to the high seas 
and the airspace rights are important elements of the states’ economic pol-
icy. The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region is characterized by 
conflicts over the access to water. Its availability is continuously increasing 
importance. The distribution of water resources in the region may become a 
source of international conflicts. Control over water as well as energy gen-
eration and distribution may thus develop into the central non-military 
power instrument. The Mediterranean could be, in short term, in a situation 
of an increasing number of internal conflicts characterized as a low density 
conflicts. Access to vitally important resources like water and the securing 
of material requirements, the right of social and political identity as well as 
participation in the political decision-making processes all describe indi-
vidual rights and interests whose implementation tends to be doubtful in the 
future. 
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2. Germany and Mediterranean enlargement of the 
European Union 
The European Union has interest in stabilizing the Mediterranean region 
since it would be immediately affected by crises and instabilities in that 
region. The most important deficit of the EU’s Mediterranean policy so far 
has been the highly selective attention given by the member states to mat-
ters Mediterranean; the developments in the Mediterranean region are re-
ceived with great attention in the immediately involved Southern EU coun-
tries while they are hardly taken note of in the North of the community. In 
their bilateral relations to the Mediterranean region regarding economic 
cooperation, trade and development aid, the EU countries have each con-
centrated on Mediterranean partners with whom they have traditional links. 
Thus, the community itself is rarely seen as one area in the immediate 
proximity of the Mediterranean region. 
Because of the different national conditions in the Mediterranean region 
itself and the selective attention given to Mediterranean issues by the EU 
countries there is a lack of consensus on the challenges that the EU is joint-
ly faced with. 
Since 1990, the EU’s Mediterranean policy has been conceived as part of a 
“policy of geographic proximity” by means of which the community wants 
to play a more active role vis-à-vis the regions surrounding it. By this dec-
ade, EU attempted to review Mediterranean policy in the light of enlarge-
ment to Greece, Spain and Portugal. The shock waves across an integrated 
single system such as the EU has become, means that the Mediterranean is 
not a region that should concern the Mediterranean EU states, in the same 
way as Central and Eastern Europe should not be the concern of the states 
of that sub-region only. No doubt, proximity will continue to play an im-
portant role; Germany taking the lead in Central and Eastern Europe, 
France, Italy, Spain in the Mediterranean region, and Italy in the Balkans. 
Furthermore, France is trying to share leading in Central and Eastern 
Europe. According to this logic, France wants to become an EU member 
state pivot. 
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The entry of Cyprus and Malta in the European Union, may strengthen the 
sensitivity of the Union towards the Mediterranean region. It will also in-
crease the Mediterranean’s group of states in the Union without threatening 
the overall balance of the Union and will benefit more the Southern Medi-
terranean non-member states in dealing with the EU. 
In my view, after a decade of a Europapolitik, Germany has changed its 
perception of the Mediterranean region. The German political class has re-
alized that as a member of a single market, Germany lies at the banks of the 
Mediterranean sea in a way. This perception within a common market aims 
to consider the regions outside the EU come closer to Germany. Even if 
Germany is involved in the expansion of the EU to Central and Eastern re-
gion because of its geo-political situation in Europe, it has to care about 
Mediterranean problems as well. As bilateral cooperation is not enough to 
tackle all the issues to face all the challenges, a regional approach seems 
necessary. 
To create an area of stability and peace, prosperity means an end to the sin-
gle issue policy. The complex nature of the region and the interdependence 
on the problems creates the need for a multidimensional approach. I think 
that Germany has to develop and to support a regional approach instead a 
bilateral one. There are a lot of challenges that have to be met and to be 
tackled despite all the criticism of the Barcelona process. Of course there 
are still risks, but there are also a lot of changes and opportunities. It is a 
matter to take a chance. In this regards, let me point out some priorities for 
the future. 
In the years to come the perceptional patterns among protagonists in the 
North and in the South will become more critical to the extend that differ-
ences of interests between Europe and its neighbors in the South will be 
increasingly interpreted as conflicts about values. The result for the gov-
ernments in North Africa and in the Middle East is a limitation of their lati-
tude for action for domestic policy reasons. Thus, an internal dramatization 
of conflicts should be avoided. Europe should resist the temptation of con-
struing every dispute in the categories of a fundamental conflict between 
North and South. As a result of the Gulf war there is a trend in the Middle 
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East and North Africa towards rejecting any conflict solutions that have 
been developed on the outside. 
In the track record of policy in the Mediterranean region, the following is-
sues should be supported: 
Economic stability: the consolidation of trade relations and the promotion 
of equalization of economic interests in the region. 
Reduction of developmental differences, so far implemented in trade 
agreements and financial protocols, more strongly represented in the devel-
opment policies of the EU member states. 
Military stability: the prevention of military predominance in favor of one 
side, within the Middle East and North Africa region, with reference to Is-
rael and between the Northern and Southern states bordering on the Medi-
terranean. 
Stabilization of the protagonists: support for those forces that contribute to 
cooperation and the equalization of interests in the region; further devel-
opment of political cooperation in the sense of intensifying and institution-
alizing the dialogue. 
Avoidance of war and its consequences. 
The first point I would like to focus on is the economic cooperation. Most 
of us know that the economic cooperation between the Southern partici-
pants of the Mediterranean partnership is still poor. The regional coopera-
tion has to be supported as it is a way to fight the asymmetry of the partner-
ship. This could be done by foreign investments to initiate a new process of 
regional cooperation. This will create a new pressure to get a more com-
petitive economic structure and to boost the reform of the economic body. 
The second point is the question of the domestic political structure. There is 
still the underlying contradiction of the partnership that the political and 
economic cooperation being successful would endanger the power and the 
influence of the political elites in many of the countries in the Mediterra-
nean region. Nevertheless, as there is a change of generation there is a 
chance for political change in the region. 
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The third point I would like to raise is the dialogue at the level of civil so-
ciety. As it is just starting, more emphasis should be put on intensifying 
dialogue not only between the classical type of NGOs but on the economic 
level with trade unions or other associations. 
Fourth, as a source of instability in the region, the peace process is not only 
a matter of European interests but also a European responsibility for the 
whole region. 
In the long run, the rule of law and democracy are central elements of po-
litical and economic stability in the Mediterranean region. What is needed 
is to find more and better ways in which the countries of the region can 
come together in a concerted effort of economic region-building. The chal-
lenge for EU and particularly for Germany is to boost efforts already under 
way to open up national economies to productive intra-regional trade, in-
vestment and technology sharing in order to deepen the collaborative proc-
ess and to ensure that existing regional economic institutions are truly ef-
fective instruments for region wide economic development and creating 
new ones as necessary. 
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Why Germany should become more ac-
tive in the Mediterranean 
With September 11 Germany is faced with the necessity of defining ist po-
litical goals and priorities in the Mediterranean area, above all in the field 
of security politics. Over the last ten years German politicians have becom-
ing increasingly aware that Germany is not immune to potential dangers 
and risks from Europe’s southern rim. Nevertheless, among German politi-
cians the prevailing assessment of security politics is that Germany is not in 
the right position for an active Mediterranean policy. From the German 
point of view, the Southern Europeans are logically tied to the task of fac-
ing the Mediterranean challenge due to historical ties, geographical prox-
imity and a much closer network of formal and informal contacts. Germany 
itself should concentrate on the stabilization of Eastern Europe, the devel-
opment of the European Union, the restructuring of the transatlantic rela-
tionship and the integration of Russia into a European security-architecture. 
The perception takes account of the immediate German security interests 
resulting from the geostrategic location of the country. However, it does 
not consider sufficiently that important strucutral and institutional conse-
quences are resulting from the Mediterranean region’s increasing relevance 
for European security. To ignore this could lead to a weakening of Ger-
many’s position in the Western alliance. From this point of view, a German 
Mediterranean policy and – as ist core element – the development of a 
Mediterranean concept would be a first important step to counteract such a 
trend. 
Since the end of the East-West conflict the international system has been in 
a state of flux. In the emerging multipolarity there is no unifying threat to Why Germany should become more active in the Mediterranean 
the states of the Western hemisphere. The tendency one can observe is that 
of risk diffusion, which implies the different perception of security threat 
by the Western states due to diverging geographical locations and geo-
strategic preferences. The result of risk diffusion is that the members of the 
transatlantic community tend to be hesitant to engage in confrontations 
with other states when their own security is not immediately threatened. In 
other words, partners are less willing to cooperate and pursue a united stra-
tegy towards regional crisis. Thus, consensus building, the prerequisite for 
common action, will become more difficult in and between security-related 
institutions in europe. 
Turning to the Mediterranean, this means that only some members of the 
Western alliance perceive possible dangers from the region as a threat to 
their own security. Other member states see such threats as far as less prob-
lematic or even non-existing. Thus, the geostrategic consensus which char-
acterized Western security politics during the last 50 years no longer exists. 
In southern Europe this trend leads to rising concerns. Considering the nu-
merous crisi-phenomena in the southern Mediterranean area, and the many 
social and economic interconnections between the European and non-
European Mediterranean countries, the worries of the south can hardly be 
dismissed. 
Regarding the diffusion of risks and threats this leads to two conflicting 
tendencies within the transatlantic institutions. The first tendency is that 
only a minimal consensus in many security-related areas is achievable. This 
could lead – in the long run- the southern Europeans to enhance efforts to 
establish sub-regional security structures (as they did in the beginning of 
the 90‘s) outside the existing alliances. At least regarding the southern di-
mension it is not unlikely that NATO will no longer bethe central point of 
reference for the security policy of those states, even if NATO is increas-
ingly looking South. If such a trend should occur , the previous position of 
Germany as the most important partner of the US in Europe could be put 
into question, since germany is not a protagonist in the process of formula-
tion and implementation of security measures on Europe’s southern flank. 
For this reason it is quite obvious that the South alignment trend puts Ger-
many in an uncomfortable position because it could lead to a loos of influ-
  89Carlo Masala 
ence within NATO (a process that has already started and will be acceler-
ated in the future).  
For Germany, therefore, more attention to the Mediterranean should be an 
important component of a political strategy that could counteract a possible 
erosion of alliance structures and a decline in the German capability to act 
within the Western alliance. The central elements of German Foreign Pol-
icy over the last 50 years, Westbindung and Ostverbindung, are essentially 
based on a uniform framework embodied in the European integration and 
the North Atlantic alliance. The maintainance and strengthening of this 
framework represents a central element of Germany’s raison d’état in the 
field of foreign policy. 
Following this line of argumentation, the integration of Germany into the 
western Mediterranean policies could be an important stept to safeguard the 
continuity of Germany’s foreign and security policy. Accordingly, Ger-
many’s Südeinbindung (inclusion into the south) is an important step in 
protecting and consolidating Germany’s Westbindung (integration into the 
West). 
All in all, Germany’s Mediterranean challenge does not result primarily 
from immediate threats to ist national security but from functional require-
ments. 
If Germany wants to protect ist influence on transatlantic and European se-
curity policy, it should actively take part in the formation and implementa-
tion of transatlantic Mediterranean politics.  
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